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A Personal Word to the Major Instructor and Second Reader.
In the preparation of this paper some deference has been
shown to popular thinking through giving perhaps a disproport ional
amount of space to subjects which- are .just now prominent in the
thought of the world, such as nationality, and to phases of the
subject which have elicited the most elaborate and prolonged
academic discussions, such as the legal aspect of the Finnish
const it ut ion.
Some divisions or subdivisions of the subject are treated
at great length— but under the conviction that each point so
discussed contributes to the conclusions. The brevity of some
divisions is partly due to haste in preparation and partly to
the opinion that elaborate treatment was not desirable, or at
least was not necessary.
Time has not permitted the rereading of the text for
the correction of typographical and similar errors.
The continental svstem of indicating dates has been
employed throughoutf for the sake of uniformity with the dates
appearing in quotations— and possibly to add a touch of
original ity.
In places literary smoothness has been sacrificed to
exactness— as in the repetition of names or terms in close
proximity where 3 use of synonyms would have improved the style
but might have permitted ambiguity.
Pages are not numbered, for convenience in final revision.
There are 68 pages following the title, divided thus; Outline 6,
Bibliography 4, I 11, II 19, III 34, IV 2, V 1.

ANALYTIC OUTLINE
Introductory statement of Finland's declaration of
independence.
It must be studied in the light of General principles.
I. BASIS OF A CLAIM TO INDEPENDENCE.
1. An indeDendent state should possess national unity.
A. Vagueness of terms 'state' and 'nation' as
commonly employed.
The root idea in a state is political organization.
Lieber's definition of a nation quoted.
Root idea in a nation is conscious community of interest.
Rose's definition of related terms quoted.
Nationality, the unifying force of a national group, is
primarily psychological,
Is sufficiently important to this study to receive more
extended examination.
B. Nationality Inductively Studied:
£. Racial relationship a natural source of nationality.
The familiar Aryan and Cephalic Index Race Theories
their unreliability.
Historically /justified classification Its influence
uoon national unity.
Citation of Hebrews, Celts and Teutons, immigrant types
in America.
Conclusion that Race furnishes a predisposing tendency
toward nationality, but of itself is neither a dependable
unifier within the group nor an impassible barrier between it
and its neighbors.
ii. Language as a source of organic unity.
Instances of its uniting influence of common speech and
of the separating power of diversity..
—
Notable exceptions— America, Switzerland.
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Greater significance of the literature which the language
embodies.— Chaucer, the Cid, Shakespeare, Schiller, Rousseau.
Conclusion that language is most significant to nationality
as a vehicle for thought and ideas.
iii. Religion and Culture as sources of nationality.
Influence of religion among Moslems, in England and Holland
in 1588, in Bohemia under Ziska, in modern Ireland.
Cultural pride and 'missions' of modern peoples.
Growth of fraternal consciousness and altruism have made
us
both religion and cultural ideals less significant within the
national bounds.
iv. Geographical contiguity as a national source of unity.
Citations of examples and apparent exceotions.
Conclusion that it gives a constant and powerful tendency
toward unity.
v. Vitalizing forces have often made active otherwise
quiescent natural tendencies.
Great national ideals, as in modern Italy and Revolutionary
France.
Distinctive institutions; as a national church, a commercial
program, progressive governmental institutions.
National perils or wrongs England and the Danes, Prance
and Jeanne de Arc, Spain and Napoleon, Montenegro and the Turks.
C. Conclusion that nationality rests upon a group
of predisposing circumstances and becomes effective through
vitalizing influences acting upon or through them,
Is defined as a psychological unifying force based upon
an aggregate of relative interests.
2. An independent state should possess a constitutional
status legally expressed.
Obligation of a government to make known the principles
of its operation.
Constitutional bearing twofold: between the government
agency and the people; between the government agency and other
states.
Element of contract, so of moral obligation, in each.
State's claim to independence should be in conformity to
established constitution if possible. Otherwise it should receive
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full and immediate expression in constitutional forms.
3. An independent state should possess a reasonable prospect
of perpetuity consistent with its fullest development and
harmonious inter-relations with other states.
Temporary unity does not justify permanent organization.
Nations sometime^ need independence for normal development
of their institutions, at others they need patronage of neighboring
states.
National independence should not be a menace to nor cause
of friction with ad|acent states.
II. FINNISH NATIONALITY.
A strong sense of national unity in Finland is a fact, its
nature may be studied.
1. The Finlanders are of the Altaic race family, remotely
related to other Finnic tribes, and perhaps to the Teutons, but
not to the Slavs.
This race distinction has not been exclusive, and is a minor
force in Finnish nationality.
2. Geographical Situation.
Natural barriers surrounding Finland.
Internal communication, climatic conditions, and tfcade
routes prevent extensive intercourse with Russia.
These circumstances have served to foster Finland's
national unity.
3. Finnish Language and Literature.
Proportion of the people who speak Finnish. Character of
the language, Its scientific study and legal recognition.
The Finnish literature— 'Kaievala'.
Systematic utilization of literary idealism to promote
national consciousness..
4. Education, Religion, and Culture.
Progressive character of Finnish educational institutions.
Religious idealism of the Finns, and its relation to
neighboring cults.
Finnish culture and the east.
The aggregate of these elements have powerfully advanced
the national aspirations of the Finlanders.

5. Distinctive Institutions and Ideals,
Capacity of the Finnish mind to adopt new ideas.
Political democracy and economic co-operation in Finland.
Such institutions are a promoting and fostering force in
Finnish nationality.
6. Effects of Russif icat ion.
The Finnish spirit was powerfully awakened by Russian
encroachments.
This was a movement of all classes, and brought the
sense of national unity to keen expression.
III. POLITICAL HISTORY OF FINLAND.
1. Finland under Sweden.
A. Narrative of essential events from the conquest by
Sweden to the cession to Russia.
B. The Swedo-Finnish Constitution.
Status of Finland under Sweden.
The fundamental laws common to both countries.
Quotations from the Form of Government, 1772,
and the Act of Union and Security, 1739.
2. Finland under the Czars, 1808-1885.
The auestion stated:
A. What constitutional status did Alexander intend
to give, and what did the Finlanders understand they were
receiving?
B. How far was the Swedish constitution of Finland
respected by the Czars?
C. What changes were mads in the Finnish constitution
during this period?
A. Purpose of Alexander I gathered from quoted documents.
Conclusion that Alexander gave a definite constitutional
status with guaranteed rights, and that the Finns so understood
t&s* act.
B. The guaranteed rights of the Finlanders were invaded,
but the emperors repeatedly declared the confirmation of such
rights. Quotations.
C. Revision of the constitution.
Law of the Diet, 1869.— Quotations.
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3. The Finnish Constitution during the Period of Russif icat ion.
A. How extensive were the Russian encroachments upon the
guaranteed rights of Finland?
8. Were these encroachments justified?
C. Did this policy legally change the Finnish Constitution?
A. Narrative of Russif icat ion.
Attitude of Russian statssmsn.
B. Commercial and military rights of the Empire in Finland.
These were not advanced by the imperial enterprises and
that policy was not justified. Laws of 17 June, 1910, quoted in
evidence.
C. Recognized extra-legal methods of amending constitutions.
Vacillation of the imperial policy and consistent?
opposition of the Finlanders.
Conclusion that these enforced changes were without legal
basis or binding force.
4. Finland's constitutional status since the Russian revolution.
Unsatisfactory nature of evidence.
Narrative of the revolution.
It destfcoyed the only Russian authority recognized in
Finland.
3oth^ the Revolutionary and the Bolsheviki governments
recognized the principle of Self-determination of national
groups.
The Finlanders have made a public declaration, and are
de facto independent.
IV. FINLAND'S FUTURE.
Uncertainty of the future in detail.
Patent facts:
Finland's chief industry will continue to be the
production of forest and dairy products.
Her democratic and progressive spirit is so grounded that
it will continue to dominate.
Her geographical situation will cause her internal
development to be largely independent.
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Political alternatives: Independence, Federation, Autonomy,
Subluxation.
Independence has been declared and is the defacto status.
Federation merely an hypothesis. Its chief end would be
mutual defence.
Autonomy likewise for defence of the small nation. It is
meaningless under a disorganized Russia.
Involuntary subjugation would be antagonistic to the
popular mind, contrary to the declared principles of western
nations, artificial and unstable.
V. SHALL FINLAND BE INDEPENDENT?
This is the final question.
The evidence summarized:
Finnish Nationality is permanently grounded and vitalized.
The democratic constitution a Dermanent and living
inst itut ion.
Future probabilities favor independence.
Conclusion— That Finland's claim to independence is the
logical outcome of historic develooment, is /justified by
present conditions and future probabilities, and must be
approved.
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FINLAND'S CLAIM TO INDEPENDENCE
Finland has declared her independence. Seizins? the
occasion offered by the Russian revolution, the Finnish government
has taken over such governmental powers as were not already in
its hands and has declared its political subordination to Russia
to be at an end. The Finns claim that their action is not only
one of policy but one of right; and expect it to be justified in
the public opinion of such parts of the world as will evaluate the
facts, uninfluenced by prejudice or interested motives. To rightly
weigh the evidence in support of such a claim it is necessary to
study it in the light of general principles which have gained
recognition from all intelligent peoples; and it is wise to embody
these principles in a clear statement of the essentials of an
abstract claim to independence, the necessary elements of a claim
which would be universally acknowledged as just and wise regardless
of the identity of the people who might advance it and of the
circumstances which might impel them.
I. BASIS OF A CLAIM TO INDEPENDENCE.
1. An independent state should possess national unity.
A. This raises tfoe question of the precise meaning
attached to the terms 'state' and 'nation', terms which have been
employed so loosely or with such variations in sense even by
careful writers that they are often confusing. Many able scholars
use the terms synonymously, especially those of the older school;
but there appears a recent tendency to recognize certain essential
characteristics of each which may be lacking in the other, a
certain root idea distinctive in each. This is not so much due to
a new and more scientific analysis of political units as to new
developments in the units themselves which significantly change
1
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their nature without changing the names by which they are called.
A state is invariably understood to be a unit politically organ-
ized and active; but when a 'state without the state' is formed
bv the federation of distinctly recognized states under a govern-
ment which takes over such essentially state functions as defence
and foreign affairs,, it is a question how the term should be applied.
No one will doubt that in 1870 Prussia was distinctly a state,
likewise Bavaria, but in 1915 the Empire was the state. Here the
kingdoms also states? Similarly the grouping of nations under an
imperial state or their division into distinct dtates or the growth
of such a national unit within an established state raises the
question of what constitutes and limits national existanee. When
did Great Britain become a nation; at the time of political union
or subsequently? The Canadian is a subject of the British state.
Is he a part of the British nation? If not, has he a nation of his
own? Did the British nation embody the American colonies in 1774?
In what respects was their nationality different in 1789?
As the state is primarily political it may conveniently
be defined as that group of people which is organized and operates
as a political unit, exercising supreme authority within its bounds.
In federated groups the supreme authority rests with the agency
authorized to deal with other states as such. The state may embody
antagonistic elements and unite them by any means, but while a
group is organized in conformity to recognized authority the state
remains. Lieber's statement of the characteristics of a nation is
a helpful attempt to define the term in its modern sense:
"What is a nation in the modern sense of the word? The
word "nation
7
on the fullest adaptation of the term means, in
modern times, a numerous and homogenious population (having
long emerged from the hunters and nomadic state) permanently
inhabiting and cultivating a coherent territory, with a well
defined geographic outline, and a name of itd own, — the
inhabitants speaking their own language, having their own
literature^ and common institutions, which distinguish them
clearly from others' and similar groups of people, being
citizens or subjects of a unitary government, however sub-
divided it may be, and having an organic unity with one
another as well as being conscious of a common destiny.
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Organic, intellectual, and political internal unity with pro-
portionate strength and a distinct and obvious demarcation from
similar groups, are notable elements of the idea of a modern
nation in its fullest sense. An" nation is a nation only when
there is but one nationality; and the attempt at establishing
a nationality within a nationality is more inconsistent and
mischievous even than the establishment of 'an empire within
an empire'.*
This is a comprehensive statement of the essential attributes of
the ideal national state. Powerful states exist without some of
the most fundamental of these attributes. A well known example
is the Austro-Hungarian state, which is composed of more than one
nation and a number of groups which have not arrived at a national
status. On the other hand can a people who have lost or who have
not arrived at unitary political organization be justly considered
a nation? Did the Polish people cease to be a nation after the
partition of their country among foreign states? Will Canada never
be a nation without total separation from Great Britain? State
organization may be the normal expression of national consciousness
and the culmination of the forces of nationality, but a people
possessing these attributes may be restrained from such organization
by force of arms, by considerations of policy, or by the inhibiting
power of long established convention. Does this exclude them from
the category of nations? Such groups have been called nationalities;
but this is a very loose term and has been applied to groups
possessing little or no national consciousness and in disregard of
geographical contiguitv, sometimes on a basis merely of common
racial inheritance, sometimes merely on account of a common political
allegiance. The abstract uses of the same word to designate, first
the status of nationhood, then the forces which produce national
consciousness in a state or are tending to produce it in a partly
organized people, make more apparent the need of careful and
discriminating definition of terms. Dr. Rose has indicated his own
definition of these terms in the introduction of his work on
'Nationality in Modern History':
*Nat ionalism, pp 7-3, quoted by Krehbiel, p 1.

- 4 -
"The sense which I attach to the words 'race 1
,
'people 1
,
'nation 1
,
'nationality', 'nationalism', is, briefly, as
follows: . . I have rarely used the word 'race', and then
only as a quasi-scientific term. The word 'people' I have
generally used as imolying a close sense of kinship; 'nation'
as a political term designating a people which has attained
to state organization; 'nationality 1 (in the concrete sense)
as a people which has not yet attained to it; but I have
nearly always referred to 'Nationality', in the ideal sense,
namely, as an aspiration toward united national existence. .
I have used 'nationalism' to denote the intolerant and
aggressive instinct which has of late developed in Germany
and the Balkan States."
It seems inconsistent to limit the term 'nationality'
to aspirations toward united national existence, f or the complex
of forces which produce it continue to operate progressively
after the attainment of political unity. Consistency suggests that
the term be applied to the aggregate of unifying forces which
produce national consciousness in the people of a nation of in a
group imperfectly oSTganized. Consistency would go a step further
and designate as nations all groups in which a powerful nationality
has resulted in an active national consciousness though current
usage does not justify this use of the term. Even Bluntschli*
could not restrict the latter term to organized states; and,with
the recognition of the facts that nationality is fundamentally
psychological and that patriotic emotion is directed to the nation
rather than the state^has arisen a demand for that harmonizing of
terms which will understand nationality to be the unifying force,
national consciousness the phenomenon giving it expression, and
the nation the group unified by it. The importance of nationality
in this study and the emphasis which it is receiving in current
political philosophy demand more analytic definition, and for the
purDOses of such definition the subject should be inductively
studied.
Theory of the State, p 95.
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B. Nationality: Racial unity naturally suggests itself as
a fundamental forde in nationality. Theories upon the subject have
long served to explain sympathies within certain groups or antipathies
between them. Anthropologists have long started from a recognition
of primary races such as the black, vellow, and Aryan and have
proceeded to divide each into race groups such as the Celtic and
Germanic and these into subdivisions such as the Cymric and Gaedelic
Celts or the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian Teutons, the division
being based primarily upon common elements of language and culture.
Recently this theory has been seriously discredited by evidence
that the phenomena which were supposed to prove identity of race
have appeared where such identity was manifestly absent. The partial
collapse of this so-called Aryan Race Theory was hastened by the
enthusiastic promulgation of Its successor, known as the Cephalic
Index Theory. According to this hypothesis the peoples of Europe,
with a few adventitious exceptions like the Magyars or Bulgars, are
classed in three race groups differentiated according to the color
of hair and eyes and primarily by the ratios of certain skull
measurements known as the cephalic index. Recent investigations,
instituted by Professor Fran£ Boaz of Columbia University, appear
to show conclusively that the cephalic index varies with changes
of environment. Confirmation of this conclusion would be the over-
throw of the theory and of the classifications based upon it.*
It would seem that the only reliable race grouping is the historic.
?/here the ancestry of a oeople is definitely known, its relations
with another group equally well known may be determined. Where
i Spermanent characteristics distinguish two groups, they may for
convenience be styled race distinctions. But a positive class-
ification of all the peoples of the earth seems at present to be
impossible.
To determine accurately the influence of recognized
racial divisions upon nationality is difficult because of the complex
of forces always at work within the same group. The scrupulously
preserved racial purity of the Hebrews certainly served to strengthen
and perpetuate their national it y, both while a state and after
sub.iugat ion; but their national antipathies were as bitter toward
kindred Semitic tribes as toward Hamitic or other neighbors. The
centuries of enmity between the Celt and the Teuton the
X North /A mneriCdvi RevieiA/ (2) c i'r , / 9/2,.
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Frenchman's disgust with the uncouth German and the obtuse
Englishman, the Englishman's contempt for the loquacious French-
man, the volatile Irishman, and the emotional German, The Scot's
scorn of the unstable southerner all indicate the negative or
repellent phase of a force which operated equally to unify the
groups having these characteristics in common. Against this we
note the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms of early England figtting each
other with a ferocity never shown toward the Celt, the unity
developed in spite of widely differing racial elements in France
and England, and the fact that other unifying forces have been
present and frequently occupying the paramount place in the
consciousness of developing nations. The Negro and the Mongolian
in Ameriaa contrast forcefully with the Celt and Teuton immigrants
from northwestern Europe, while those of Slavic and Greek blood
occupy an intermediate place between these extremes. There are
forces of nationality, cohesive among the foreigners rather than
repellent among the Americans, which make it much more difficult
for some of these groupd than others to be assimilated. There
seems to be no complete assimilation for the Mongolian. The Negro
is being assimilated and suppressed at the same time. The northwest
European immigrant readily adapted himself to American nationality,
but he from the south and east maintains his own nationality with
great tenacity. In the case of virtually all the groups from Europe
factors of language, religion, and customs are much more potent
than that of race. In the case of the Mongolian, race may be said
to be a powerful factor. Likewise with the negro, race qualities
have caused him to be repelled by the whites rather than restrained
by any nationality of his own. But the wide racial difference
separating the American Indian from the white man have not prevented
him from being rapidly absorbed by the latter. Such phenomena as
the pan-German, pan-Slavic, and pan-Hellenic movements are not true
expressions of racial affinity but are artificial appeals to a real
or fancied relationship to 2ain support for some enterprise which
is not adequately sustained by the vital interest of those concerned.
It may be concluded that the racial unity of a people
Drovides a broad predisposing foundation for nationality, scarcely
an active tendency toward it. This gains in significance with the
degree of variation from contiguous peoples. Such degrees of
variation can be determined only by a study of the specific groups,
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not by any previously ascertained principles of relationship;
though observation shows that the better known peoples have
largely the degree of relationship accorded them in the
traditional race groupings. Race is neither an inseperable barrier
between peoples nor a dependable unifier within the group. It
has been less significant in modern times than in the more prim-
itive, chiefly because of the greater relative potencv of other
forces; but its chief contribution to nationality in all times
has been s tendency to perpetuate the logically organized racial
groups.
ii. Language is thought of as nob only an evidence of
national unity but as a potent factor in producing it. The
student at once thinks of the outstanding strong nations which
speak a single language and of the diverse peoples who have gained
national unity through a process which at the same time brought
about unity of speech the Latinizing of Italy, the union of
Ssxon and Norman through the use of the modified English popularized
by Chaucer and Wycliffe, the harmonizing of Spanish dialects.
Conversely polyglot Russia and Austria, the abortive union of the
Dutch- and French- speaking Netherlands, disunion in French-
speaking Canada, sustain the same principle. Against these evidences
must be set the example of vital American nationality, independent
of England, but using her language, literature, legal and social
institutions to an unparallelled degree. Switzerland enjoys a vital
national life though her people speak the languages of her three
great neighbors and have much in common with them in the respective
districts.
In nearly every instance where diverse groups have
adopted a common speech it has been imployed to embody the idealism
of the nation in literature. Chaucer san^ the romance and Langland
sDoke the moral earnestness of the nation in the speech of the
whole people. The militant spirit of the Spanish nation, born in
the struggle with the Moors, rings through the fierce ballads of
the Cid. Shakespeare, Schiller, Rousseau, each was the spokesman
for his nation at a time when national life ran deep and strong.
It would seem that not the language but the thought which it
embodied was the nationalizing force. The value to a developing
group consciousness of a common vehicle of thought is not likely
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to be overestimated, but it is as a means through which the
forces of nationality can express themselves that it contributes
to national unity.
iii. Religion and culture suggest themselves as
sources of nationality. Ripley maintains that religion is a
better index of racial relations than language or institutions.*
We are familiar with the robust and active unity of the Moslem
peoDles in their wars of conquest and religious propaganda.
England in 1588 and Holland during the same period showed a
compelling patriotism which gained its force largely from
religious enthusiasm and antipathy. The violent national aspirat-
ion^ of the Bohemians in the days of Ziska was religious in its
source, and tp-day the Irish question would have little political
interest but for the religious prejudices which embitter it.
All that need be said on this subject is that with
the growth of the idea of human brotherhood outside the national
limits there has come a reinterpret at ion of religious obligation
which has lifted it out of the sphere of antagonizing impulses,
and through tfoe more understanding evaluation of other groups
nations have losfi much of the notion of being especially guardians
of distinctive tenets with a mission in the dissemination of truth.
Some peoples the Greeks, the French, the Germans have cultivated
a more or less justified national pride in their cultural excellency
with a corresponding disdain for others, but the growing altruistic
idealism in orofessional and cultural circles of recent years has
demanded the principle of unrestricted diffusion rather than
mcnoooly for national ag^ancUzement , and religion or culture by
themselves have less of national unifying significance than ever
bef ore.
iv. Geographical contiguity would seem a most natufal
predisposing source of national unity. The narrow patriotism of the
Greeks has been explained as due to physical barriers. The same
reason has been assigned for the strong clan loyalty of the Scotbh
Highlanders of one valley and their fierce enmity toward another
clan on the other side of the mountain. Similarly in every
Haw
.
o : ,--< X
peninsula, island, or other segregated district which has held a
unified population, some degree of that unity may be ascribed to
* The Races of Europe.

- 9 -
the influence of natural barriers which shut out diverse elements
and shut in upon itself the enclosed group while its peculiar
characteristics grow strong through self-reinforcement.
Against this may be urged the vital unity of the Hebrews,
though dispersed in many lands, and the sense of oneness with the
mother country which lives in the feeling of the English, French,
or Spanish colonial. Exoerience, however, has shown this sense
of unity to be relative and that it yields to a new nationality
nearer home when that becomes sufficiently developed. The Jew in
New York becomes truly American; the colonial's allegiance is to
Canada or Australia in a sense more truly national than that to the
home government. Geographical contiguity may be held to be always
a powerful and constant unifying force. Often it is temporarily
suppressed by other and greater aggregations of forces. The increased
facility of intercourse in modern times has made its significance
less obvious, but even in the larger world groups its influence to
limit or promote national unity is deep and strong.
v. Vitalizing Forces: The forces of national unity which
we have been studying are common to many peoples and are more or
less constant in their operations. Their presence in various groups
would be expected to produce much the same result in each case.
But the records of national movements show that such forces have
been vitalized by distinctive and timely interests when they have
resulted in notable manifestations of nationality.
Great ideals have been a potent cause of some of the most
vital phenomena of national unity. It is sufficient merely to
mention the manner in which the allegiance of the citizens of
Naples, Sicily, Piedmont, Sardinia, the Papal States, fused in a
new national loyalty when the ideal of a united Italy began to
take practical form among them. Equally notable was the solddity
of the new French nation in 1789, captured by the enthusiasm of the
democratic ideal not only for themselves but for all Europe. These
and similar examples show natural tendencies to unity ineffectual
in themselves till brought to white heat by the ambition of a
national ideal.
Distinctive institutions may operate to vitalize the
forces of unity. England's national church, more independent of
paoal control than that of any continental country, was always
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a ffcuitful source of national enthusiasm. The commercial unions of
northern Europe, the policies of 'the open door', the 'white man's
burden', mercantilism, representative government, have been not
only inspiring ideals but gratifying and solidifying sources of
national pride to the peoples who have possessed them.
Equally potent and even more dramatic are the national-
izing movements which have grown out of a sense of national peril
or wrong. England became a nation when her vefcy existance was
threatened by the Danes. France beaame a nation when Jeanne de Arc
led out the troops of the Dauphin to save the kingdom which was
all but lost to the invader. Spain became a nation when she found
herself defenceless at the feet of Napoleon. Montanegro has shown
a keen sense of national life for centuries under the shadow of
the Turkish peril, reenforced with the conviction that only in
the united defence of the Black Mountain was safety to be found.
This sense of national peril has lent itself to the purposes of
demagogues and propagandists, but when resting upon facts
intelligently understood it has been one of the most compelling
unifiers of national life.
C. True nationality will be found usually to rest upon
a group of predisposing common interests such as those of race,
language and literature, religion and culture, and geographical
situation. Some or even all of these may be absent in specific
cases, but almost sufcely such natural sources of unity as are
present will come to expression only when linked up with some
living national ideal or similar force in the mind of the people.
Nationality must be defined as a psychological unifying force
based upon an aggregate of relative interests.
2. An independent state should possess a constitutional
status legally expressed.
This is but the statement of a world-wide conviction
that every government is under moral obligation to act in
accordance with established and known principles that all who
have dealing with them may reasonably infer what requirements the
government may make. A constitution has a two-fold, bearing. It is
an understanding between the agency of government and the
individual citizen, and safeguards the rights of each. Similarly
it is an understanding between the government agency and foreign
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states. In either aspect some element of contract, and hence of
moral obligation, is involved. Constitutions are not violated
without jeopardizing these contractual rights of the citizen,
the government, or the foreign state. Any state claiming independ-
ence should do so under the provisions of the constitution to
which it has been subject if possible; otherwise it should speedily
establish a precise and public constitution with the least possible
violation of established forms that all may know the principles
by which it will be guided.
5. An independent state should possess a reasonable Drospect
of perpetuity consistent with the fullest development for itself
and with harmonious inter-relations with other states.
This principle is self-explanatory. If a national group
possessed conditions of independent existence which arc only
temporary it should not establish a constitution or government
which soon will cease to reflect the true aspirations of its
Deople. Some of the vitalizing forces which have been described
as bringing nationality to perfection and making it permanently
active have arisen in other groups which did not have the
underlying bases for permanent unity and have shown themselves
temporary and unreliable to an extreme degree. Nations have
ed
existed possessing institutions or resources which demandAan
independent status for their free development, at other times
nations have been so related that they could not come to full
development without the patronage or co-operation of neighboring
states. Also conditions could arise under which the independence
of a state would be a standing menace A"or a soufcce of friction
with neighboring nations. These considerations are vital, and
the demand $bk any national group for independence should bs
specifically studied in the light of these questions.
The foregoing principles express the fundamental
reauirements of a logically grounded independent state. No
group of people which is seriously deficient in any one of
these points can justly ask for independent statehood nor
wisely exercise its powers should they be gained.
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II. FINNISH NATIONALITY.
That there is a strong and conscious national unity
in Finland is a patent fact. To the better value it as a basis
for a claim to independence it should be studied both in regard
to the predetermining circumstances which have fixed its form
and to the vitalizing impulses which have given it potent force.
1. THE RACE OP THE ^INLANDERS.
Linguistic and other theories of race classification
are agreed in a general way that the Finns belong to a racial
stock whose descendants extend across northern Russia and into
Asia. Rioley holds that the Letto-Lithuanians and Teutons belong
to the same stock while the Slavs are distinct in origin.*
During the migratory days other than Finnic elements were thrust
out of the Russian plain by Slavic inroads and found a refuge in
modern Finland. Nevertheless, the West Finns are the purest
survivors of the Finnic stock, sharing with the Scandinavians
the distinction of being the tallest people in Europe. By this
hypothesis their nearest race relatives would be the Finnic
elements among the White and Great Russians and the Finnic tribes
to the east. They would possess a more remote relationship to the
Teutons, especially those of Scandinavia, but would have little
in common with their near neighbors the Lapps or with the Slavic
stock. This general classification may or may not be an accurate
analysis of facts, but observation shows that a race group has
developed in Finland, seeming to have been long distinct from
neighboring groups, possessing a strong individuality, yet without
the radical distinguishing characteristics which erect insurmount-
able barriers about such a group. This Finnish stock has been
modified along the frontiers by contact with Lapps and Scandinavians,
*Ripley, Races of Europe, p 365.
1%
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but as a whole it has showed a considerable affinity for the
Teutonic neighbors and bids fair to absorb the ten percent of
Swedes in the population without being noticeably modified. As
contributing to Finnish nationality the element of race has not
been a highly potent factor. It has contributed to a strong internal
cohesion, but paradoxically does not seem to have manifested itself
in external repulsion of a marked character. At most it can be said
to have furnished a remote predisposing tendency toward national
unity but one which seldom appeared among the more vital forces.
2. INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION.
*
A glance at a map will show Finland, with adjacent Lapland,
to form a large peninsula shut in on the north by Arctic Ocean and
the great sweep of the White Sea, on the south by the great gulfs
of Bothnia and Finland, and on the east by the great interior lakes.
It is connected with the Scandinavian countries far to the north
and with Russia by the interstices between the lakes. How far these
land links are highways for vital intercourse and to what extent
the water boundaries are barriers becomes the question.
The fact that the bulk of the population both of Finland
and Sweden is in the south and near the sea has made the land route
between the countries unimportant. On the other hand the neck of
land between Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland has furnished an
east and direct route into the great Russian plain for any form of
land traffic. However, land traffic with outside nations has been
cf minor importance in the development of Finnish industries and
commerce. The remarkable systems of inland lakes, together with the
fact that the markets for Finnish products lie beyond the encircling
arms of the sea, have made Finland preeminently a land of water
communication. Numerous canals have supplemented the natural water-
ways, and today it is possible for a great part of the export trade
of Finland to be carried on wholly by water, goods being floated
to the coast on the lakes and rivers and in some instances loaded
upon the Baltic steamers at points far inland. Even since the
building of the railroad, the greater part of the traffic with
Petrograd has been by the gulf steamers. The fact that the Baltic
*Chief authority, Frederiksen, Ch. IX.
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harbors are frozen nearly half the year has not diverted traffic
greatly from its natural course, and of recent years the harbors
of Hango and Abo have been kept open throughout the winter by the
use of ice breakers. Traffic within Finland is preeminently
freight transportation. This is even more true of the foreign
commerce from her ports. The contact with other peoples has been
of the long-distance type by which great ideas and principles are
readily transmitted but without the modification of local usages
which are acquired only by close and prolonged intercourse.
Finland has adopted some of the most progressive institutions of
western nations but has engrafted them upon the peculiar social
structure which it has been developing through the centuries of
comparative isolation. We cannot doubt that the individuality of
Finnish nationality has been an outgrowth of the climatic conditions
which predetermined the nature of its domestic life and commerce
and has been largely fostered by the natural barriers which did
much to shut it in upon itself and to exclude the influence of
neighboring peoples which might have modified such national
individuality.
3. THE FINNISH LANGUAGE AND LITERATUTE.
*
Eesides a handful of Russian speaking people there are
in Finland between 300,000 and 400,000 people, mostly along the
south and west coasts, who speak Swedish. The remainder of the
population of about 3,000,000 speak one of the West-Finnic
dialects which may be called Finnish proper. This is a subdivision
of the Finno-Ugric branch of the Altaic grouo of languages, thus
being as distinct from the Aryan languages as they are from the
Semitic. There are East- and West- Finnish dialects with inter-
mediate variations, but the differences of idiom are not suffic-
ient to seriously interfere with mutual understanding and are
rapidly being obliterated by closer intercourse between the
sections and a common literature. Finnish is written with an
alphabet of twenty-three letters, the English letters C, 0, X,
and Z not being used. It possesses a good vocabulary and is
capable of rich literary expression. A valuable Finnish dictionary,
compiled largely from earlier linguistic studies, was published in
1826, and Lonnrot's splendid Finnish-Swedish dictionary in 1880.
The first Finnish grammar, written in Latin, was published in 1649.
*Chief authority, Godenhjelm— History of Finnish Literature.
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Prior to the Reformation Latin was the language of the schools
and church, but after tfrat time Finnish came largely into use.
During the Swedish occupation the language of Sweden was the
language of the government in Finland, and after the separation
from Sweden in 1809 naturally this continued because virtually
all the officials were of Swedish ancestry and speech. By the
Ordinance of 25 October, 1858, the Finnish language was authorized
in disputations and dissertations, and gained equal rights with
Swedish in everything immediately concerning the Finnish population
1 August, 1363, while on 9 February of the same year Russian had
ceased to be an obligatorv subject in the elementary schools. The
Decree of 20 February, 1865, admitted the Finnish language into
courts of law and government offices on the same footing as Swedish,
and on 30 November, 1871, the Senate was authorized to determine
the language of the modern schools according to the preponderant
language in the district concerned. Among the Finnish grievances
under Nicholas II were the imperial demand for the compulsory
teaching of Russian in the public schools and the requirement of
a knowledge of Russian as a qualification for office holding in
Finland.
Finland possesses in the vernacular one of the richest
literatures of northern Europe. Long before Christianity was
brought in from Sweden Finnish bards sang the epic glories of
famous men of old and incantations to the forces of nature.
Through the cent uries
A
has developed a wealth of lyric verse and
prose folk-tales and a notable collection of shrewd proverbs and
ingenious riddles. To these have been added a religious and a
political literature and able translations of classics in other
tongues. The Rew Testament was translated into Finnish in 1542
and the entire Bible between 1602 and 1642. A Catechism, Prayer-J^
Book, and Psaltar appeared in 1552 or earlier, and a hymn-book in
1580-82. An improved hymn-book, published in 1701, continued in
use until 1886. In 1771 a Swedish scientific journal was published
at Abo, and four years later the first edition of the Finnish News
was published in the language of the people. In 1831 a group of
enthusiasts for Finnish nationalism, mostly teaehefcs or students
of the University of Helsingfors, founded the Finnish Literary
Society which has made possible extensive scientific studies in
the language and literature of the Finns and the publication of
1
- 16 -
many of tfee most notable contributions to Finnish literature both
ancient and modern. Among the many really great works of Finnish
literature the greatest and the mast famous is the Kalevala. It is
a collection of ancient epic fragments and rune songs collected
from the lips of country and forest folk and woven into a connected
epic by Elias Lonnrot. It was first published in 1835, but since
has been republished many times and translated into the leading
languages of Europe. It furnished the verse form and much of the
imagery for Longfellow's 'Hiawatha'. Max Muller said of this
great epic:
"Kalevala possesses merits not dissimilar to those of
the Iliad, and will claim its place as the fifth national
epic of the world, side by side with the Ionian songs, with
the Mahabarata, the Shanameh, and the Niebelunge. "*
The influence of the Finlander's literary inheritance
upon his consciousness of national unity will scarcely be over-
estimated. The wide fundamental difference between the language
and those of other west-European peoples gave a powerful tendency
to separate development, which was greatly strengthened by the
deliberate program in educated circles of promoting 'Fennomania'
,
as the ardor for Finnish nationality was termed, through the
cultivation of a distinctive national literature. In 1821
Arwidsson popularized the watchword: "We are not Swedes, we do
not want to become Russians, we must be Finns"; and this ideal
has never been absent from Finnish literary ambition during the
century. The Finnish language is steadily gaining in relative
importance over the Swedish. Educated Swedes in Finland make
themselves familiar with the Finnish language and literature
both for its cultural value and as a means of intercourse with
the mass of the people. Unquestionably the Finnish language will
become more and more the dominant language of culture, business,
and government and will be a oowerfnl agency in perpetuating a
vital Finnish nationality.
4. THE EDUCATION, RELIGION, AND CULTURE OF FINALND.
The history of education in Finland compares favorably
with that of other northern lands. At an early date there was
*Quoted by Vincent, 'Norske, Lapp, and Finn', p 241.
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a cathedral school at Abo and others in Viborg and Rauma, but
these were chiefly for the training of priests, and advanced
culture was sought abroad at Paris, Prague, or Leipzig. The
University of Abo was founded in $640, but Latin Remained the
vehicle of the highest culture until after the great northern
war, 1721, when Swedish became important. As early as 1542
Agriccla published a Finnish Abe-Book or Primer. The protestant
reformation encouraged the use of the vernacular in education
and gave a great impetus to schools for the common people. Under
the patronage of the church one or more national schools have
been maintained in every Lutheran parish and less than two per-
cent of the population are illiterate, while in a few communities
in the east dominated by the Greek-Russian Church seven-sixteenths
of the population lack any kind of education.* The Finnish univer-
sities opened lectures and degrees to women in 1870, and public
high schools for all the people, adopted from Denmark, have spread
over the country. x
Although the Finns were christianized by the swords of
their Swedish conquerors, they speedily came to hold their new
religion with an enthusiasm equal to that of the Swedes and to
regard themselves as the outpost or frontier of Christianity
against the massed paganism to the east. When Protestantism
overspread Sweden and Finland the situation remained about the
same but with an added stimulus because of the more aggressive
vigor of the rival systems. Finland held the great northern
frontier against a possible extension of the Roman faith through
the Ealtic Provinces or of the Greek Church from Russia. In the
Thirty Years' War Finnish troops formed two-fifths of the army
of Gustavus Adolphus although the population of Finland was only
one-fourth that of Sweden. + In common with north Germany and
Scandinavia, Finland has remained a stronghold of Lutheranism,
and has jealously resisted any extension of the Russian Church
by maintaining the law that only Lutherans were eligible to
Finnish offices and by closely interweaving the educational and
social life, atleast in the country districts, .with the church.
*Finland— English Journal, No. I, p 6. *Camb. Mod. Hist.. XII,
pp 292, 762. +Finland—Eng. Journal, No. I, p 2.
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It is said that modernly in the cities and to Quite an extent in
the educational circles religion has come to be a conventionality
with little of vital interest to the people. This group coincides
largelv with the part of the population which is of Swedish
ancestry and speech. On the other hand the religion of the country-
man from the days when the 'Kalevala' was forming to the present
has been a stern or hopeful reality vitally related to life. To
this group, which takes an active part in public life, the
defence of his religious institutions from foreign interference
or foreign ideas is a patriotic and practical duty.*
In a broader sense Finland has regarded herself as the
outpost of western civilization against the grossness of the Slav
and tfce barbarism of the north. An apt parallel has been drawn
between Finland, cut off from the west by the arms of the Baltic
and exposed to the Muscovite advance from the east, and the
situation of the Greek cities in Asia at tfce time of the Persian
advance to the Aegean. How far this parallel can appropriately be
carried may be a question, but the consciousness of possessing an
advanced and progressive culture which must be guarded from the
encroachments of comparative barbarism is to the present day a
compelling ambition to the Finnish mind from the forest commune
to the university in the capital.
The culture of the Finns, including their educational
institutions and religious ideals, has been recognized as a
potent source of Finnish nationality. M. Stolypin complained
that "intellectual culture from Alexander University down to the
public schools created the 'dogma' of Finnish autonomy". * The
same thought dictated the imperial demand to specify what text-
books should be used in the Finnish schools, to censor the
Finnish press and literature, and to open Finnish oflfices to
Russians of the OrthadoX faith. These forces in the Finnish
consciousness have been largely repulsive, thev have tended to
thrust the Finns away from Russia; but they have been prevented
by other circumstances, such as geographical situation and
natural barriers, from throwing Finland into the arms of Sweden
or any other nation so have resulted in a powerful stimulation of
the individual nationality of the Finnish people.
*Reade, Finland and the Finns. ^Finland and Russia, p 47.
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5. DISTINCTIVE INSTITUTIONS AND IDEALS OF FINLAND.
The Finlander has shown a notable capacity for adopting
institutions of fckBK other nations and building them into his
system with remarkable success. It would be impossible to inumerate
all institutions so borrowed, but mention of a few will suffice to
show the progressiveness of the Finnish mind and to hint at the
pride of the Finlander in this enterprizing policy.
Mention has been made of the new constitution of 1906,
reorganizing the Diet as a unicameral body, granting woman suffrage
and proportional representation. The University of Zurich was the
first in Europe to open its courses to women, 1367, but this was
done with even greater freedom by the University of Helsingfors in
1870. Equally significant is the growth of co-operative organization.
The 'Pallervo Society' was organized at Helsingfors in 1899 for the
purpose of advocating and aiding co-operative societies and has been
instmental in spreading such organizations over the country. In
1913 such societies numbered 196,000 members with funds of £471,715
and doinc? an annual business amounting to £5,356,000. By 1915 there
were in Finland 415 co-operative stores, 396 co-ooerative dairies,
441 co-operative credit societies, and 794 other co-operative
societies, a total of 2,046. This is preeminently a movement of
the country people; yet, although barely eleven per-cent of the
co-operative societies are in the cities, an average of one-tenth
of the whole population are members. *
These typical movements indicate a broad and active
spirit of democracy among the whole people. Class distinctions
disappeared half a century ago.* The Finn has been growingly
conscious of the inconsistency of this democracy with the
autocracy of imperial Russia. He has taken keen pride in main-
taining hisi democratic and progressive institutions, while the
institutions themselves have operated to deepen his spirit of
independent initiative and to intensify the sense of common
interest with his fellow citizens. Finland's distinctive inst-
itutions are both a cause and a consequence of her growing
national unity.
*3ebhard, Co-operation in Finland, pp 57-9,64.
^Finland—English Journal, p 6, No. I.
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6. EFFECTS OF RUSSIFICATION IN FINLAND.
The unifying of a people in the shadow of impending
peril is a familiar phenomenon. The experience of Finland has not
been unlike that of other peoples who have come to their highest
realization of common interest through a sense of common danger.
It is doubtful how complete a conscious**** nationality would
have arisen in Finland but for the fear inspired by Russian
aggression the ** instinct of collective self-preservation
applied to institutions and liberties. This is certain The
impulses toward a closer affiliation among themselves and the
desire for a mors dignified and free national status which had ks
been taking form in the Finnish mind under the influence of bi
heroic literary traditions and enthusiasm for progressive institut-
ions was brought to a condition of intense earnestness by the
deliberate policy of Russif ication. The energy with which the
gigantic petition of protest to the Czar of 1899 was pushed
far into the frozen north * the steady years of passive resistance
u
following, the aa*nanimity of the national strike of 1905, these
indicate a consciousness of common interest and a sense of common
danger which prompted the Finlanders of all parts of the country
and of all occupations to act together. The fact that there was no
active move for a separation from Russia and that there was little
violence under the administration of Bobrikov and the later
premiership of Stolypin shows the Finlanders 1 regard both for
expediencv and order, while the prompt declaration of independence
when Russia fell into anarchy following the revolution shows that
the impulse toward independence was only held in check by the
consciousness that there was no fit opportunity for it to gain
expression. We have seen that Finnish nationality is amply grounded
in national predisposing circumstances such as the distinctive
race stock and language of the prevailing group of the population;
it has been fostered by comparative geographic isolation, a
nationally centered educational system, and a church having no
recognition in the politically dominant state; it has gained
expression and renewed stimulus in an idealizing literature and
*De Windt, pp 88-94.
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progressive political and economic institutions; and it cams to
a very vital spirit of democratic co-operation through resistance
to the attempts of outsiders to destroy' it. A nationality so
grounded and gaining expression in such forms can only fail of
prolonged progressive existancs through most exceptional
inhibiting forces.
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III. THE POLITICAL HISTORY OP FINLAND
1. FINLAND UNDER SWEDEN, XII Century to 1809.
The circumstances out of which Finland's political
institutions drew and the influences, both from within and
without, • which modified them are so complex that the significance
of this period to succeeding times can only be understood in the
light of its historic setting. A review of the military and
social movements which brought Swedish Finland into contact with
Russia is as significant as an analysis of purely political
develooments.
A. Narrative Background.*
During the XII and XIII centuries Finland was christianized
through a series of crusades from Sweden, being conquered and
brought into subjugation to Ssedish authority. Settlements were
formed, and the steady extension of Swedish influence to the south-
east soon brought it into conflict with the city-republic of
Novgorod. Hostilities were frequent during the XIII and XIV
centuries, until some measure of peace was established by the
Peace of Orekhov (Noteborg), 12/24 August, 1323, and that of Derpt,
1351. The Russian Czar Ivan III conducted an abortive campaififl
into Finland, 1495-1497, and conflict continued with slight
intervals until the time of Peter the Great. At the Swedish
conquest Finnish socistv was very primitive, and Swedish laws
and usages wers readily adopted. In the middle of the XIV century
the oolitical distinctions between Finlander and Swede were
abolished; Finland became an integral part of the Swedish kingdom,
having the same constitution, civil laws, and financial system,
and the same active rights concerning, legislation and the election
of kings. * The government was reorganized in I5I3-6 and in 1600
*General Authority, Dyer & Hassall, Osten-Sacken, Cambridge
Modern History. *Mechelin, Public Laws of Finland, po 1-2.
LI
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King Charles restricted the Finnish nobles to the same liberties
as those of the peers of Sweden.*
St. Petersburg was founded in 1703 and became the new
capital of Russia. Immediately Peter saw that the Swedish frontier
must be thrust farther from the Neva if his ambitious commercial
projects were to thrive in safety. Accordingly in 1710 he invaded
Finland and in June occupied Viborg, which he styled "the pillow
of St. Petersburg". The incompetence of the Swedish commander in
Finland gave Peter large advantages, and his successor could do
little but retfceat steadily to the north. On, 13 March, I7l4,he
stood at bay at Storkyro and was1 annihilated. By the end of that
year all Finland was in Peter's hands, but by the treaty of Nystad,
30 August/11 September, 1721, * all but part of Viborg was returned
to Sweden. Hostilities began again in 1741 when Sweden declared
war to aveng the death of the Swedish envoy who had been robbed
and murdered while passing through Russia, apparently with the
connivance of local authorities. By the Manifesto of 18/30 March,
1742, the Empress Elizabeth sought to induce the Finlanders to
secede from Sweden and to set up an independent government,
promising them her support, but without result. Later Russian
successes placed Elizabeth in a position to force the cession
of the remainder of Viborg by the Peace of Abo, 7/19 August, 1743.
All Finland had been occupied by Russian troops in 1742, but the
parts ,west of the Kymmene were restored on condition that Adolph
Frederick of Holstein-Gallorp be elected successor to the Swedish
throne. This meant the extension of Russian influence at the
capital as well as in the provinces. Sweden formed a galley fleet
( Skagardsf lotta) to nly among the islands of the Finnish coast,
Russian propaganda in Finland continued, and in 1788 war broke
out anew. The Swedish army in Finland mutinied and made overtures
to the Empress Catherine, proposing to found an autonomous
government under her protection and presenting an act of confed-
eration signed by 113 Finnish officers.* Two years previously
she had approved the proposal of her able and farsighted statesman,
Sprengtporten, that Finland be established as an independent state.
Accordingly at the outbreak of the war the Russian Council of State
I
Cambridge Modern History, IV, 175-181. +Ibid.
xQsten-Sacken; 20 May, 1720, in Cambridge Modern History.
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drafted a manifesto in which Catherine invited the Finns to oall
together their own Diet to declare their independence, and promised
her support, * There was no important response to these overtures.
Gustavus won several successes, and peace was established 14 August,
1790. The next year Sweden and Russia were in alliance.
*
At the conference of Tilsit, July, 1807, Napoleon pressed
upon Alexander I the demand that he force Sweden to observe the
continental blockade against England. Accordingly after the bombard-
ment of Copenhagen by the English Alexander demanded that Gustavus
IV revert to the policy of armed neutrality. Gustavus appealed to
England, and on 8 February, 1808, a treaty of subsidies was formed
by which England promised £100,000 monthly for twelve months if
Sweden would maintain an army and a fleet. Alexander dispatched
an ultimatum to Stockholm on 22 February and the Russian army
invaded Finland before an answer could be given. + At the news
Gustavus arrested M. Alopeus, the Russian ambassador at Stockholm;
and when Alexander learned of this he declared to the foreign
ministers that he would not make reprisals but would regard
Swedish Finland as annexed to his empire. Although defeated in the
Baltic by the English fleet, Alexander won steady successes from
the Finns and Swedes, and bv the end of 1808 had forced the Swedes
beyond the Kemi at the head of the Gulf of Bothnia. In March, 1809,
Gustavus was forced to abdicate; and his successor, Charles XIII,
concluded the treaty of Fr iederickshamn, 17 Septembet, by which he
agreed to conform to the continental system, with exceptions, and
ceded to Russia the Aland Isles, Finland, and part of West Bothnia.**
Already Alexander had announced to the Powers (16/28 March, 1808)
that Finland was annexed as a conquered province to his empire, and
the same announcement was made to the Finnish people in the manifesto
of 20 March/1 April. As required by this manifesto the people
generally took the oath of allegiance to Alexander, at Abo 9/21
and 10/22 May and elsewhere 10/22 May and the days following. It
seems, however, that Finnish victories in the interior and the
influence of Sprengtporten induced a more liberal purpose, and
5/17 June the Emperor issued a manifesto declaring his purpose
*Finland and Russia (Int. Conf
. ) 48. xCamb. Mod. Hist.
+According to Osten-Sacken, 9/21 Feb. °Dyer & Hassall. **Ibid.
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to retain Finland as a part of his dominions but emphasizing the
value of Russian protection and promising the preservation of
established Finnish institutions. An armistice was concluded 7/19
November, 1808, and deputies were summoned to St. Petersburg to
reoresent to the Emperor the wishes and needs' of Finland. They
were received 17/30 November, but stated that they were not
comoetant to discharge the task laid upon them, recommending
that the Estates be called together, and presenting a fcesume of
the Finnish constitution for the Emperor's private information.*
By a decree of 19 November/l December a government council was
created for Finland. It was to be under the presidency of a
governor-general, the highest authority in the land, who was to
report directly to the Emperor. Sprengtporten, the declared friend
of Finland, was named first Governor-General.* He had previously
advised the calling of a diet of the Finnish Estates, and the same
decree which created ihM6l(i the government council announced that
such a diet would shortly be summoned. On 20 January/l February,
1809, the decree was published calling the assembly to meet a£
Borga on 10/22 March, 1809. On 15/27 March the Emperor published
a letter which pledged the maintenance of the rights and privileges
of the Finnish people according to the constitutions. The following
day the Diet was opened with an address from the Emperor in which
he repeated the same pledges. On the 17/29 the Estates took the
oath# of allegiance and the Governor-General read a translation of
the Act of Assurance of the 15/27. On his departure Alexander
issued the Manifesto of 23 March/4 April, making known the oath
of allegiance of the Estates and the contents of the document of
15/27 March. The Emperor returned to Borga and presided at the
closing of the Diet, 7/19 July, 1809, making an address in which
he congratulated the Finns upon being placed in the rank of nations
and pictured a prosperous future for them under the protection of
their own laws. The treaty of peace, 5/17 September, legalized
internationally what Alexander had done. It was ratified at St.
Petersburg 1/13 October, and the incorporation of Finland and
peace with Sweden were promulgated in a manifesto of the same
date.
*Cf. Document g below, p3 j ,

B. The Swedo-Finnish Constitution.
As has been shown, in the XIV century Pinlanders gained
the same rights of citizenship and the same position before the
law as those of Swedish subjects. The wide difference of race did
great
not seem to be a sisse barrier to close intercourse, but the broad
gulf of Bothnia formed a real separation between the most thickly
settled parts of the two peninsulas. Since 1587 Finland had been
distinguished as a "Grand Duchy", and often in Swedish laws
"Swedes" and "Finlanders" occur as coordinate expressions. At the
time of Erik XIV for a short time Finland was ruled as a vassal
duchy by his brother, Duke John; but with this brief exception
the Grand-Duchy never had any separate administrative existance
nor autonomy. It was a group of Swedish provinces subject to
general Swedish laws, and the Estates of Finland participated
regularly in the Swedish Diet. On account of geographical isolation
Finnish local diets were held on several occasions, especially
during the XVII century, even for separate provinces,* but this
did not signify that Finland possessed any constitutional
individuality nor formed a separate state.
The foundation of the Swedish constitution, which would
be the Finnish constitution of this period, is the 'Code of the
Land' of 1442. The penal and civil laws of this code were replaced
by the Code of 1734, but the 'King's Chapter' ( Konungabalken)
remained in force, being quoted in the constitutional acts of the
XVIII century and notably in Section 2 of the laws of 1772.
Previous fundamental laws were largely superseded by the Form of
Government ( Ragerings-formen) of 21 August, 1772, which in turn
was modified in part by the less democratic Act of Union and
Security of 21 February andAApril, 1739. Among other enactments
fundamental in their nature might be mentioned those constituting
the Four Estates:
The privileges of the order of the nobility, 1723;
The orivileges of the order of the clergy, 1723;
The confirmation of the rights of the burgesses and
of towns, 1789;
The confirmation of the rights of peasants and the law
on the rights of proprietor^ of non-privileged lands, 1789. x
*Osten-Sacken, p 48. *Mechelin, D 30.
I
These remained in effect in Finland with little change until 1863.
The Form of Government of 1772 and the Act of Union and
Security of 1789 are so vital to later developments that their
more significant sections should be quoted at length:
We (the Estates and People), regard ourselves as free,
law-abiding and trust-worthy subjects, under a lawfully crowned
king, who rules us according to the written law of Sweden.
— Act of Union and Security, Art. 2.
To the King it belongs to rule his kingdom, as the
law of Sweden saith, He and no other; He shall maintain, love,
and guard right and truth; evil and injustice shall he forbid,
avert, and suppress; He shall do injustice to no man, in life
or hanor, body or goods, who has not been legally presented or
condemned; He shall deprive no man, or permit to be deprived,
of his prooerty, movable or immovable, without legal examination
and judgment, and he shall rule the kingdom according to the
King's Chapter, the law of the land, and this form of government.
—Form of Government, Article 2.
The King shall make no new law nor alter an old one
without the knowledge and consent of the Estates.
—Form of Government, Article 40.
The King's majesty shall defend and protect the
realm, above all against hostile and foreign powers, bat he
shall not against law, royal oath, and assurance, impose upon
his subjects war levies, new tributes, taxes and other charges,
without the knowledge, free will and assent of the Estates of the
realm, yet excepting such disaster as that the realm were
attacked by armed force; then the King's majesty has the right
to take such measures and steps as are in accord with the
security of the realm, and the welfare of the subjects; but
as soon as the war ceases, the Estates must meet and the new
charges imposed on account of the war must cease immediately.
—Form of Government, Article 45.
As true freedom consists in contributing of their free
will what may be needful for the maintenance of the kingdom, so
the Swedish people possess an indisputable right, together with
the King, of concerting and arranging, rejecting, and assenting
in such matters.
— Act of Union and Security, Article 5.
I
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2. FINLAND UNDER THE CZARS PRIOR TO THE ADOPTION OF THE
POLICY OF SYSTEMATIC RUSSIFICATION, 1808-1885.
Controversy regarding Finland's constitutional status
during this period has been long and bitter. The controversialists
make claims ranging from the ultra-separatists' contention that
Alexander I erected an independent state having no political
connection with Russia beyond the common interest growing out of
the fact that the Emperor and the Grand-Duke were the same
individual, to the opposite contention that the Emperor merely
assured the people of the Finnish province of his empire that
their natural and inherent rights would be protected by Russian
laws and that it was his purpose to accomplish this end through
the usages of the Swedish laws which were familiar to them, and
that this pledge, being the act of an absolute sovereign, could
be revoked at will. The essential points of the historical and
documentary evidence can be conveniently analyzed in the answers
to three questions:
i. What constitutional status did Alexander I intend to
give to Finland at the organization of the 3rand4Duchy under
Russian authority, 1808-9, and what status did the Finlanders
believe they were receiving?
ii. How far did Alexander I and his successors respect
the Swedish constitution of Finland?
iii. What recognized changes were made in the Finnish
constitution during this period?
A. Alexander's Purpose and the Finlanders' Understanding
of It.
The evidence on this subject consists chiefly of a group
of state documents, and as this question has been the preeminent
subject of controversy, the documents which throw light upon it
should be examined at some length. The following are quoted in
chronological order. Analysis and comment are reserved to the
close of the quotations ( page37ff) . *
*Except as otherwise indicated, quotations are from Osten-Sacken,
Apoendix. ?Jhere no authorized iA6iiH6i\ translations are avail-
able, they are given in the original French.

- 29 -
(#0 Proclamation of Count Buxhoevden of 18 February, 1808, issued at
Friedr ichshamn (in Swedish):
"In spite of your Constitution, the King of Sweden made an
attack on our frontiers, which was as unexpected as it was un/just.
(By this is meant the war of 1788).
"As however, there may be many circumstances and affairs,
for the adjustment of which a good neighborly acquaintance, confid-
ence of the inhabitants in the deliberations, and a unanimity of
opinion will be necessarv, we do therefore invite you herewith, as
quickly as it would appear possible, to send your deputies from
each province according to the legal ratio, and as is customary
at your usual state councils (Riksmote), to meet in the town of Abo
in order to confer about all that may be further accomplished for
the welfare of the land.
"The Grand-Duchy of Finland will from this moment, and
until further notice, be considered like one of the other
conquered provinces of the Russian State, which under the mild
rule of His Majestie's predecessors and now under Kis scepter
are enjoying a happy peace, with the maintenance of all privileges,
the free exercise of religion (rights and advantages), just as
they enjoyed them formerly, are enjoying them at present— and
more still. "
(b) Imperial Manifesto of 20 March, 1808.
"From the declarations issued at the time it is known what
just considerations brought us to a conflict with Sweden and the
dispatch of our troops in Swedish Finland. The safety of our
Fatherland wrung these measures from us.
"Almighty God granted His help to our just cause. Our
troops with their usual courage, fighting against obstacles and
overcoming all difficulties which stood in their way, making
themselves a way through places which were heretofore considered
impassable, meeting the enemy everywhere and bravely defeating
him, conquered and occupied almost the whole of Swedish Finland.
| This land thus pacified by our arms, We do now hereafter definitely
annex to the Russian Enpire, and in consequence of this We have
given orders to administer the oath of true allegiance to Our
throne to the inhabitants. Informing Our faithful subjects of this,
We are convinced that sharing our feelings of gratitude for the
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decision of Almighty God, they will add their earnest prayers that
his all-embracing power will assist Our brave troops in their
further victories, yea, that He may bless and crown our arms with
success and keep out of our Fatherland the dangers with which its
enemies sought to encircle it.
(C } Imperial resolution announced to the War Council by the Minister
of War on 1 .May, 1808:
His imperial Majesty was graciously pleased to command:
To consider Swedish Finland, annexed forever to the Russian
Empire by virtue of the Imperial Manifesto of 20 March last, as
being on the same footing as the Finnish province in the northern
region .
Concerning titles in the documents of the Abo Hofgericht of 27
May, 1803:
In consequence of the communication of His Excellency
the Commander-in-chief, the Most Gracious Count Buxhoevden, of
the 25th instant, the following legal changes are to take place
at the imperial Hofgericht:
-
(1) . Ey command of His Imperial Majesty Alexander I,
Autocrat of all the Russias, the verdict or decision of the
Imperial Abo Hofgericht is to appear:
(2) . In the text "Imoerial Abo Hofgericht". &c.
Manifesto of 5/1? June, 1808:
£ ) We, Alexander I, &c . . To our loval inhabitants of the
newly incorporated Finland of every class.
After We, by the immutable decrees of the Almighty, who
blesses our arms, incorporated forever Finland in the Russian
Empire, We saw with satisfaction the solemn promise of the
inhabitants of this country, to be forever loyal subjects of the
scepter. At the same time we assumed the sacred obligation of
maintaining in unshaken firmness and in unalterable union with
Russia this possession which God's providence intrusts to Us.
In the circle of the peoples who are subject to the Russian
sceptre, and form an indivisible empire from hence forth the
inhabitants of Finland have taken their place forever. From this
great body nothing can separate them against the will of Providence
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of the Almighty. The same Providence which favored the conquest of
the country by our brave armies will protect its retention and
inseparability.
Inhabitants of Finland! May this truth be impressed ineffac-
ably in your hearts. Under the protection of our Throne live many
peoples in peace and ouiet; their fortunes are equally dear and
valued to our heart; in entering our empire you have acquired the
same rights as they possess. Eesides the ancient institutions
which are peculiar to your Country and will be faithfully guarded
by us there is opened to your activity and your industry a new
field of labor.
(f) . Decree summoning the Diet of Borga 20 January, 1809:
Since, by the decree of Providence and the success of our
arms the Grand-Duchy of Finland has been united forever to our
empire. . We have commanded and do herewith command that, agreeably
to the constitutions of the country, a great Diet shall be held in
the town of Borga on the 19 March of the present year. In consequence
hereof the representatives of the Estates shall assemble there in
tha manner prescribed by the regulations for the Qiet in order to
consider such measures as we shall think fit to submit to them for
their deliberation. *
(g) . Description of Finland's Constitution, 1809:
Pour fairs une description complete de la constitution
de la Finlande et ce aui doit etre observe', a l'occasion d'une
Di§te, demands plus de temps et d 1 eclaircissement que le moment
ne pr£sente. Ne voulant au sur plus rien exposer que ce dont on
est parfait sur, a l'e'gard de sa me'moire, on doit ne'cessairement
s'attendre a beaucoup de lacunes dans ce present apercju.
La Finlande, depuis les temps les plus recules re'unie a
la Suisde, a ete' gouverne'e d'apres ses lois tant fondamentales que
civiles. Les premieres se fondent principalment sus trois principes.
1. Que le pays soit gouverne' par un Roi assujetti
aux lois;
2. Que tout les citoyens, sans exceptions, soient
libres, ainsi que proteges, tant k la vie au'a leurs propriete's;
*Finland and Russia (Int. Conf. in London), p -
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3. Que la Nation, moyennant ses representants, a le
droit de faire sa constitution, dieter ses Lois et stipoler les
contributions du Pays.
Le Droit du Roi est celui de pourvoir a tout les offices,
. . .
Ci-devant les Etats s 1 assemblerent chaque troisieme annee,
et meme plus souvent, et avaient des droits bein plus elarge's
qu'a present, mais depuis le changement de regence de 1772 et
I'acte de Surete' de 1739 ils sont resteeints au circonstances
de ci-dessus nommes.
(h) . Ceremonial confirmed by His Majesty 22 February, 1809:
Sa Majeste Imperiale, assis sur le Trone, prononce un
Discours. Le Gouverneur-General en donnera une explication
en langue Suedoise.
Le Chancelier, place sur la seconde marche du Trone,
inviteeB le Noblesse a la prestation du serment de fide'lite',
dont il lira les paroles k haute voix; la Noblesse s'approchant
du TrSne, les repetera apres lui. Les autres Etats procederont
de la m£me maniere.
Apres quoi le Gouverneur-General declarera, qua Sa Majeste'
Impe'riale a daigne confirmer solennellement la constitution de la
Finlande, en la sanctionnant de Sa signiture; il lira a haute voix
I'acte de Constitution et le remetta au Mare'chal de la Noblesse.
(i) . Swedish translation of Act of Assurance of the 15/27 March,
1809:
We, Alexander I &e do make known: That Providence having
placed us in possession of the GrandrDuchy of Finland, We have
desired hereby to confirm and ratify the religion and fundamental
laws of the country, together with the privileges and rights which
each class in the said Grand-Duchy in particular, and all the
inhabitants in general, whether high or low, have hitherto enjoyed
according to the constitution. We promise to maintain all their
benefits and laws firm and unshakable in their full force.
In confirmation whereof We have signed this Act of Assurance
with our own hand.
(j). Speech of the Emperor at the ODening of the Diet on 16-28
March, 1809:
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Par les decrets de la Providence appele a gouverner un peuple
bon et loyal, j'ai desire voir ses repre'sentans reunis autour de
Moi.
J'ai desire vous voir pour vous donner une nouvelle preuve de
Mes intentions pout le Bien de votre patrie. J'ai promis de maintenir
votre constitution, vos lois f ondamentales; votre reunion ici vous
garantit me oromesse.
Cette reunion fera epoaue dans votre existance politique, elle
est destinle a affermir les noeubs qui vous attachent au nouvel
ordre des choses, a comple'ter les droits que le sort de la guerre
ra'a de'fe're's par les droites plus chers a Mon coeur plus conformes
a Mes principes, ceux oue donnent les sentiments de 1 'amour et de
1
' affection.
(k). Speech by Bishop Tenystfcom at the opening of the Diet on 16/28
March, 1809:
Sire:
-
Le coeur noble et les sentiments e'elaire's et liberals de
V. II. I. auriient sans doute suffisamment nous garanti 1' inviola-
bility des promesses tres gracieuses, que V.M.I, des la premiere
entree de ses armees victorieuses en notre pays, nous a bein
daigne donner d'une conservation inalterable de notre culte, notre
forme d ' administration et de tous ces autres droits et privileges,
dont nous avons jouis /juseju ' ici , sous l'abri des lois fui de^ja en
plusieurs siecles • cassis ont fonde et maintenu la surete et le ft©"
bonheur de chaque su.iet finnics.
Mais V.M.I, a neanmoins eu las gene'rosite d'offrir aux
Etats de Finlande, assembles ici par les ordres tres gracieux de
V.M.I., des nouvelles contestations de la saintete des assurances
qui leur ont ete de.ja donnees de la parte de V.M.I, et en meme temps
de recevoir des nouveaux hommages de fidelite d'un peuple soumis
et 44 reconmaissant.
(1) Speech of Peter Klockars, Talman of Peasabt's Estate:
. . .
L'ordre des paysans se reprlsente premierement la
grandeur de la prerente idee que V.M.I, etant vainqueur, pourtant
bien a voulu tres gracieusement permettre a une nation conquise
de s' assembler par devant l'auguste personne de V.M.I, selon
1 'order etabli par ses droits anciens, pour se faiee entendre
I
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et pour deliberer sur ses propres affairs. . .
(m). Speech of His Majesty after the taking the oath by the
Estates, 17/29 March, 1809;
Je recjois avec sensibility les serments de fidelite que
les habitants de la Finlande viennent de Me preter par i'organe
fe leurs representants.
Les liens qui M'unissent a euz, affermis par le mouvement
spontane' de leur affection, consacre's par cet acte solennel, en
deviennent plus chers a Mon coeur, plus conformes a Mes principes.
En leur promettant de maintenir leur religion leurs lois fondamen-
tals, j'ai voulu leur montrer le prix que j 'attache aux sentiments
de la confidance et de I'amcur.
Proclamation of Emperor, 25 March/4 April, 1809:
Having convened the Estates of Finland to a general Diet,
and having received their oaths of allegiance, We have desired on
this occasion by means of a solemn act done in their presence and
proclaimed in the sanctuary of the Supreme Being, to confirm and
assure the maintenance of the religion and fundamental laws, as
well as the rights and privileges which each class in particular
and all the inhabitants of Finland in general have enjoyed up to
the present time. Whilst by these presents promulgating the said
act to our faithful subjects in Finland, we desire at the same
time to make it known to them that, since We have maintained and
acted conformably to the time-honored uddges of this country we
fcegard the oaths of allegiance which the Estates in general and
the deputies of the Peasantry in particular, have freely and
spontaneously taken both on their own behalf and on behalf of
their brethren at home, as valid and obligatory upon every
inhabitant of Finland. .*
(o) Soeech of Bishop Tengstrom at the closing of the Diet on
7/19 July, 1839:
Sire:
-
Pendant tout le cours de cette assembled, dont le doux
souvenir ne sera jamais efface' des fastes de la Sinlande, les
*F & R (Int. Conf ).
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Etats de ce pays ont eu une constante experience de la bienveillance
paternelle dont V.M.I, embrasse son nouveau peuplel
V.M.I., non contente d'avoir solennellement et de son propre
mouvement devant les fcepresentants de la nation confirme les lois
du pays et les privileges et les immunites de chaque ordre, a
daigne encore a la libre deliberation des Etats offrir des objets
de la plus grande consequence touchant le gouvernement du pays et
une meilleure organisation de sa defense, de se impSts et de ses
finances. . .
(p) Speech of the Emperor closing the Diet on the 7/19 July, 1809:
. .
This brave and loyal people will bless Providence which
has brought about the enisting order of things. Henceforth placed
in the rank of the nations, under the rule of its laws, it will
only remember the past domination in order to cultivate the bonds
of friendshio when they shall have been BB*est ablished by peace.
And I myself shall have gathered the greatest reward of my labors
when I see this nation externally peaceful, internally free,
devoting itself under the protection of its laws and good custibns
to agriculture and industry, and by the very fact of its prosperity
justifying my aims and hallowing its destinies.*
(^) Correspondence of the Swedish and Russian Plenipotentiaries,
1809:
In the treaty negotiations the Swedish plenipotentiary
insisted on an "article assuring to Finland religious liberty and
the maintenance of her laws and privileges". The Russian plenipo-
tentiary wrote to the Emperor: "I do not deny that he was right
in his contention, but I found no difficulty in proving to him
how little similarity there was between all previous acquisitions
and the one your Imperial Majesty had now toade. Your Majesty had
gained the love of the ^inlanders, vou had offered yourself as
their master before the tfceaty, and had yourself obtained their
oath of allegiance.
"
x
(r) Fredrichshamn Peace Treaty of 5/17 September, 1809; Article VI:
Inasmuch as His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias has
by indubitable proofs of mercy and justice already characterized
*F & R (Int. Conf.), d 53. *Ibid.
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the mode of ruling the inhabitants of the territories acquired by
him now: having guaranteed, exclusively through the magnanimousness
of his inclinations, the free exercise of their religion and the
rights of ownership and property; so therefore His Swedish Majesty
is by that very fact released from the sacred duty of making any
stipulation whatsoever in favor of his former subjects.
(s) Prom Manifesto on Peace with Sweden, 1/13 October, 1809:
The definite hope to have from henceforth set firm and
certain bounds to Our Empire is for us the greatest advantage of
the peace concluded. Our new possessions, which on the one hand
are protected by Sveaborg and other fortresses . . . will for all
time form a strong and insurmountable bulwark of Our Empire.
In view of such substantial advantages which the conclusion
of peace has brought us, the addition of the Finnish people to the
number of our loyal subjects cannot be a matter of indifference to
Our heart. Until now almost uninterruptedly disturbed by the horrors
of war, this people will from henceforth belong to the series of
peoples who live in peace and quiet under the protection and defence
of our throne.
A few historical facts throw additional light upon this
subject. In November, 1508, Alexander summoned Finnish deputies
to St. Petersburg to represent to him the state and needs of
Finland. Baron Mannerheim, chairman of this deputation, in reply
to an inquiry from the Russian Foreign Secretary, Count Saltikoff,
.
wrote: "Under the Swedish laws the Sovereign can make no change
in the fundamental laws, nor in the criminal and civil law
established in 1734, nor in the privileges of each order, nor
establish new taxes without the consent of the Estates"*. At the
request of the Emperor Baron Rehbinder— a Finlander and the
assistant to Michael Soeranski, Secretary of State and the Czar's
tutor— assisted by de Buck, prepared a report on the Swedish laws*
which set forth at greater length the facts stated by Baron
Mannerheim* These facts were known to the Emperor and his ministers
weeks before the Diet of Borga. Sprengtporten insisted upon "une
*Fisher, Finland and the Tsars, o 30. xIbid.
+Cf. Document g, ante.

Assemble generale et const itut ionelle" for Finland.* When
Sprengtporten was appointed the first governor-general of
Finland Alexander himself directed that he should report to him
personally and not through the Russian ministers "who have nothing
to say to the Grand-Duchy". * Speranski later declared: "Finland
is a state and not a province"; + and the Emperor designates the
Grand-Duchy by the French word 'Etat', and at the closing of the
Diet speaks of Finland as "Placed from this time forward in the
rank of nations, governed by its own laws".** In the Edict of
15/27 March, 1810, he declares that his aim had been "to rule that
land in conformity with the liberties of the nation and the rights
assured to it by its constitution".
*
x When Viborg (Old Finland)
was reunited with the Grand-Duchy in 1811 the serfs belonging to
all Russians who had settled within the province became ipso facto
free, for Finnish law orohibited serfdom and the authority of
these laws within the Grand-Duchy was unquestioned. ++ The Diet of
Borga adopted a seDarate coinage, with the ruble as the standard,
but struck at Abo with the arms offethe Grand-Duchy. 00
From these facts and documents but one conclusion aan be
drawn. Apparently the emperor had no settled policy in reg,ard to
Finland early in 1808 when the successes of his armies placed the
major part of the Grand-Duchy under his de facto control;*** and
it is evident that the Finlanders, whether willingly or unwillingly,
submitted to this control as a matter of necessity. *** It is
further evident that, with a sufficient knowledge of the constitut-
ional privileges enjoyed by the Finlanders under the Swedish
kingdom, +++ Alexander I organized the Grand-Duchy with the absolute
pledge to the Estates and to the entire people that these privileges
would be preserved by himself and his successors; 000 and that the
Finlanders believed that these privileges were being guaranteed to
them absolutely and in perpetuity.**** Moreover, the King of Sweden
so understood the status which Finland was to enjoy under Russia and
implicitly included its perpetuation in the terms of the treaty of
peace. xxxx
*Fisher, p 29. *Ibid. +Idem, 69. °Cf Decree of 18 Aug. 1809.
**Finland, English Journal; No. 8, 4. x*Idem, p 5. ++Fisher.
°°F & R, (Int. Conf.), 50. ***Cf Documents a, b, c. xxxDoc. d,e.
+++Doc. g, h.
000
Doc. f, i, j, b. n, p, s. ****Doc. k, 1.
xxxxDocuments q, r (ante).
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The final conclusion is the same whether the Diet of Borga
was legally constituted or not, and whether by guaranteeing the
privileges of Finland before receiving the formal oath of allegiance
Alexander entered into a contract with the Finnish people or on the
other hand made voluntary promises in a unilateral engagement. The
essential elements of contract were unquestionably present. The
interchange of Dledges was legalized and confirmed by the treaty
of Friedrickshamn and by subsequent declarations of the Emperor;
and the Constitution of Finland was established upon a basis which
Alexander and his successors were morally and legally bound to
respect unless its modification should be demanded by developments
of national necessity, and then only by due process of law.*
B. Imperial Respect for the Finnish Constitution, 1808-1885.
The evidence on this subject comDrises chiefly the
records of Dublic utterances bv the Czars or of the deeds of the
Imoerial Government and of the representatives of Finland. Numerous
facts can be adduced to show that the Finnish constitutional
privileges were seriously infringed by the Imperial Government
on numerous occasions, also that both public expressions and
imoerial policy gave explicit recognition to the constitution and
the rights existing under it. The facts of the former character
may be briefly siimmerized.
Before the close of the reign of Alexander I a number
of more or less technical encroachments upon Finnish constitutional
privileges occurred. The appointment of a governor-general, except
far a limited period under exceptional conditions, was forbidden
by Article 33 of the 'Regeringsf orm 1 . By the ordinance of 20 June/
2 July, 1810, the Emperor ordered the surplus of the Finnish annual
budget, amounting to 1,726,000 roubles, to be paid into the imoerial
treasury in lieu of the cost of maintaining the Russian trooos in
Finland. This order was not carried out; but though it was a
violation of Article 45 of the 1 Regeringsf orm
'
, the Council of
Government made no protest. The restoration of Viborg to the Grand-
| Duchv by the Edict of 19/31 December, 1811, though gratifying to
the Finns, was contrary to constitutional requirements. Other
matters such as Finnish armv regulations, the customs, and the
*Cf International Conference in London, 1010, Fin. & Rus., pp 77-73.
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management of Alexander University in Abo were settled bv
Russian ministers with little deference for Finnish opinion.
A decree of Nicholas pf, 2/14 August, 1827, gave to persons of
the Greco-Catholic faith naturalized in Finland the right to hold
office, though Article 1 of the ' Regeringsf orm 1 restricted office-
holding to Lutherans. He had previously (1826) extended to Finland
the penalty of banishment to Siberia. In 1828 the local university
was reorganized by the Russian Ministry of Public Instruction and
in 18^2 was placed directly under the control of the monarch.
Similar government measures were adopted by the same method, among
them those of 1323 and 2/14 October, 1329, on the censorship in
Finland; of 28 May, 1839, regulating customs; of 28 March/9 April,
1840, on coinage; and of 13/25 January, 1348, regulating the
Finnish passport office. During this period from 1809 tp 1863 the
Diet was never convoked, and the Finnish Council of Government
(Senate after 1816) seems to have acquiesced in the enactment by
imperial authority of measures, which by the constitution reauieed
the concurrence of the Estates, from reasons of expediency and
because no single act of encroachment largely affected any vital
practical interest of the Finlanders.
The sacredness of Finnish constitutional rights were
repeatedly declared and confirmed by the emperors. Not only is this
done but a valuable light is thrown upon the contemporary interpret
ation of the transaction of Borga by this extfcact from the Rescript
of Alexander I to the Governor-General, 14/26 September, 1810:
"My object in organizing the affairs of Finland has been to
give to the people a political existance so that they may not
regard themselves as conquered by Russia but as attached to her
by their own evident interest and for this reason— Not only
their civil l8ws but also their political laws have been
retained* "*
In the Manifesto changing the title of the Imperial Government
6ouncil to that of Imperial Senate for Finland, 9/21 February
1816, Alexander I says:
"We, Alexander, . . being convinced that the constitution and
the laws which in conformity to the character, the customs,
Finland & Russia, pp 27-28.

and the civilization of the Finnish people had during the long
series of years formed the basis of its civil liberty and peace
could noy, without danger to these, be limited or altered, not
only did we at the moment of taking over the government of the
countrv confirm in the most solemn manner the said constitution
and laws together with the rights and liberties in consequense
thereof enjoyed by every Finnish citizen; but after consultation
with the assembled Estates of the country we appointed a special
government composed of Finnish men, which, under the name of our
Government Council, has hitherto carried on in diur name the civil
administration of the country, acting also as a final court of i
appeal, independently of every other power but that of the laws,
including that power arising from these laws which we, as ruler,
ourselves exercise. In this way we have desired to make clear
the principles which have guided us and shall continue to guide
us in our relations with our Finnish subjects, and also to confer
anew and for all time the assurance of their separate constitution
under our scepter and the scepters of our successors which they
have already received from us."*
In his inaugural, January, 1826, Nicholas I repeated the guarantees
of the Manifesto of 1809. x Alexander II in confirmation of the
Laws of the Diet, 1869, said:
"Whilst reserving to ourselves our rights as they are confirmed
in the Form of Government of 21 August, 1772, and in the Act of
Union and Security og 21 February and 2 April, 1789, and which
have not been expressly changed in the above law of the Diet,
we are pleased graciously to approve and confirm this law of
the Diet as an irrevocable fundamental law. "+
Alexander III signed the constitutional guarantees; and on 6
November, 1894, Nicholas II "sanctioned and confirmed the
fundamental laws and the rights and privileges which all the
inhabitants without distinction, both high and low, have hitherto
enjoyed in virtue of the constitutions of this country".**
*Finland & Russia, pp 25-26. xCambridge Modern History, X, 433.
°Ibid. +Finland & Russia, p 27. **Idem, p 69.
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To the expressions of the emperors may be added the record
of their deeds. In 1811 the Government Council opposed two proposals
for imperial laws, one referring to the powers of the governor-
general and the other to those of the procurator-general of the
Senate, on the ground that they were not in rigid agreement with
the fundamentsl laws of 1772 and 1789, and they were at once
withdrawn by the Emperor.* At the opening of the Diet, 18 September,
1863, Alexander II said:
"My attention has long been directed to a certain number of
auestions successively raised which concern the most serious
interests of your country. These questions have remained in
suspense because their solution required the cooperation of
the Estates, x
"I have authorized the government of the Grand-Duchy to
contract loans solely in order to meet the requirements of
the last war and to cover the eRDense of constructing the
railroad between Helsingfors and Tavastehus. . . It is my
wish, however, that for the future no new loans' be raised
without the concurrence of the Estates of the Grand-Duchy,
unless an unexpected invasion by an enemy or some other
unforeseen national calamity shiuld make it a necessity for
Us."+
f
The th summoningAthe Diet in 1863 and every five years following by
Alexander II and every three years by Alexander III with the
nature of the proposals laid before it is an express recognition
of the right of the Estates to participate in legislation,
though the Emperor was not above promulgating measures as
administrative acts when balked in his purpose by the refusal
of the Diet to concur in his proposals.** In this connection it
should be observed that no number of violations of a constitutional
right can destroy that right where those whose rights are infringed
are not in a position to make effective protest, and that no number
of such violations can nullify a single voluntary guarantee of
privileges received in good faith by those to whom it is addressed.
*Pinland & Russia, pp 61-62. *Mechelin, Public Laws,p 22. +Idem, 24
°Cf Coinage Act of 28 July/9 August, 1877.
**Cf Press Censorship Law, 1867.
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C. Recognized Changes in the Constitution, 1809-1885.
The significance of the constitutional changes during
this period lie in the facts that the ancient rights were redefined
by the Finnish Diet and published with the confirmation of the
Emperor and that there was a limited but positive extension of
Finnish privileges.
When Alexander II convoked the Estates in I863 for the
first time d>n more than half a century, he stated his purpose in
the following words:
"Many provisions of the fundamental laws of the Grand-Duchy
are no longer applicable to the state of affairs existing since
its union with the Empire; others lack clearness and precision.
Desirous of remedying these imperfections, it is my intention to
have a measure carefully preoared which shall contain explanatory
and supplemental provisions. These will be submitted to the
consideration of the Estates at the next Diet, which I propose
convoking three vears hence. Whilst maintaining the principle
of a constitutional monarchy agreeably to the ancient customs
of the Finnish people, and of which principle all their laws
and institutions bear the impress, I wish to include in this
projected measure a more extended right than that which the Estates
now possess as to the adjustment of taxation, as also the right
of motion which they formerly possessed, reserving to myself,
however, the initiative in all questions which affect the
alteration of the fundamental laws."*
A code of fundamental laws, drafted by a committee soon after
the close of this diet, was rejected by the Emperor; but a new
Law of the Diet was adopted by the Estates in 1867 and promulgated
bv Alexander 3/15 April, 1369. Sections f afcfi t 71 and 83 are
particularly significant:*
Sec. 71— A fundamental law can be made, altered, legally
explained, or repealed only on the representation of the
I Emperor and Grand-Duke, and with the consent of all the Estates.
+
*Mechelin, Public Law, dp 25-26. *Cf also Confirmation, ante.
+Finland & Russia, p 27.
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Sec. 83— The Law of the Diet shall remain in force in its
entirety as an irrevocable fundamental law, binding upon
both the Ruler and the Estates of Finland, until it shall
be altered or repealed by their concurrent decision.*
It has been noted that Alexander I added new privileges
to those already guaranteed to the Finns at Borga. x His
successors made other additions which are worthy of note. The
periodical meetings of the Diet were assured by the laws of 1867.
+
Reforms in local administration were gained in 1865 and 1873, in
the military service in 1878, and in the financial system in 1867
and 1885.° The Ordinance of 20 March, 1879, extended the electoral
franchise and eligibility among the bufcgessfes, ** and the Diet
gained the right to originate legislation by the laws of 16 July,
1886. xx
3. THE FINNISH CONSTITUTION DURING THE PERIOD OF SYSTEMATIC
RUSSIFICATION, 1885-1917.
The closing years of the reign of Alexander III mark
the beginning of that deliberate policy of subordinating the
Baltic Provinces to Russian control and of forcing Russian
institutions upon the dependent peoples, commonly known as
Russif icat ion. The change in attitude of the Imperial Government
toward Finland may be said to have inaugurated the policy about
1885, and it continued intermittently until the outbreak of the
great war in 1914, or even till the Russian revolution in 1917.
The question may conveniently be studied under three heads:
A. How extensive were the imperial incroachments" upon
tibe Finnish constitutional privileges?
B. Were these encroachments justified by new imperial
interests or perils?
C. Did the Russian policy effect a legal change in the
Finnish constitution?
A simole narrative of historic facts will be a sufficient answer
to each of these questions.
*Finland & Russia, p 27. *Ide<n, p 57. +Mechelin, p 27.
°Idem, p 31. **Idem, p 29. **Ibid (13/25 June according
to Osten-Sacken, p 85).
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A. Russian Encroachments upon Finnish Privileges.
In 1885 the Russian government imposed a high tariff
upon several articles imported from Finland. In 1883 and 1886
Russian control was extended over Finnish intermediate schools.
A revised code of criminal law, adopted by the Diet in 1888 and
confirmed by the Emperor in 1889, was summarily suspended by the
manifesto of 1/13 December, 1890, when it was discovered that it
would operate in the interests of Finnish liberty. On 31 May/ 12
June, 1890, the Finnish Post Office was placed under the Imperial
Ministry of the Interior and a knowledge of the Russian language
was required of postal officials. In 1891 the Imperial Government
be^an to assert its control of legislation touching common
interests of Finland and the Empire. At the same time Russians
with certain educational qualifications were made eligible to
official positions in Finland, and a knowledge of Russian was
requited of Finnish incumbents of these offices. During the same
year the right to hold real estate was claimed for Russian
subjects in Finland. The new emperor, Nicholas II, pursued the
same oolicy during the years 1895-1897 when he extended Russian
control to Finnish schools, forbade the display of the Finnish
unofficial flag, and modified the tfcade relations of the two
countries. In 1898 General Bobrikov was named governor-general
and brought to Finland an ambitions program which he cartied
into execution with ruthless directness. He declared:
"It is necessary: 1. To revise the text books of the schools;
2. To assert by a solemn act the legality of the autocratic
powers of the Russian monarchs in Finland; 3. To free the
orthodox schools from the guardianship if the Finnish
authorities; 4. To free the regulation of the censorship."
He placed the Finnish army under direct control of the Russian
Ministrv of War, extended the requirements regarding the Russian
language in government departments and schools, and asserted the
supreme authority of the Emperor to .judge what matters of
legislation were of imoerial interest and so outside the
province of the Finnish Diet. In 1902 the powers of the Senate
were reduced almost to nullity and those of the Governor-General
*0sten-Sacken, P 150.
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greatly extended. In I9O4 the Russian monetary standard was
introduced. The death of Bobrikov by the hand of an assassin 'in
1904 and the weakening of the imperial government through military
reverses and revolutionary movements led to a brief period in
which Finland enjoyed a partial restoration of its ancient rights.
It was during this period, 7/20 July, 1906, that the Diet, with t
the assent of tfre Emperor, tfcansf orrned itself from the ancient
Four Estates into a unicameral body elected by universal adult
suffrage.
In 1908 the Russian Council of Ministers, over the
opposition of the Senate, Governor-General, and Minister- Secretary
of State, forced a contribution of 6,670,000 marks from the
Finnish treasury to bridge the Neva and connect the Finnish with
the Russian railroads.* From this time onward the chief method
employed in Russifying Finland was the assertion of Imperial
control of Finnish legislation. By the act of 2 June, 1908, the
power to decide whether or not a Dro.iect was of imperial interest
was placed in the hands cf the Russian Council of State. By the
If
imperial law of <fo June, 1910, many matters of purely local
interest were declared to be imperial in scope. In January and
February, 1912, the Russian government applied the oriociples
of the law of 1910. The Finlanders were compelled to pay to the
imperial treasury 20,000,000 markkas. in lieu of personal military
service. A law of 2 February, 1912, gave Russian subjects in
Finland the same rights as citizens. When the Court of Appeals
at Eelsingfors declared this law to be unconstitutional, all
of the sixteen judges were kept in solitary confinement at St.
Petersburg for eight months, and at their release were disqual-
ified from holding office for ten years. Stolypin had decided
upon the absolute annexation to Russia of the two Viborg
parishes of Mykyrka and Kivinebb shortly before his assassination
in 1912. His successor, M. Kokovtsov, went no further with the
project, but was bitterly attacked for remissness by conservative
papers like the 'Novoye Vremya'. On 19 Aoril, 1912, members of
the Imperial Council declared:
"Russia has no need of the approval cf the alien populations.
*Authority up to this point, Osten-Sacken, Dp Bo-97.
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We have not taken them to give them pleasure, but because
they were necessary for us."*
Further enterprises in the Russif icat ion of Finland were checked
by the outbreak of the world war in 1914.x
B. Were Russian Encroachments upon Finnish rights
Justified?
It is a notable fact that the controvercial writings in
support of the Russian policy in Finland have dealt almost
exclusively with its legal phases and have justified it upon
legal grounds. The conclusions have been that *# Finland never
had any. constitutional privileges, or that these were given
through the grace of the Emperor and could be withdrawn at will,
g
or that the Finnish constitution was superceded and nullified
by imperial legislation after the grant of a constitution in
Russia. To the facts which have already been presented it is
only necessary to add that the law of 20 July, 1906, which
reorganized the Finnish Diet and established woman suffrage and
proportional representation among its progressive measures,
contained in Article 80 the express confirmation of the existing
constitutional law with the principle that it was immutable until
modified by the common consent of the Emperor-Grand Duke and the
Diet. This law of the Diet received the confirmation of the
Emperor; it was later in date than the new Russian Fundamental
laws.
+
In an address before the Russian Imperial Council M.
Deutrich declared that "changing conditions and international
competition demand the subordination of its bound.ry territories
to the Empire". The only apparent bearing of this principle
would be upon commercial or military interests. In each connection
a few facts are worthy of note.
Much has been made of the suggestion that, should
Russia's traditional project of gaining access to open ports in
the south meet with definite discouragement, this end might be
realized through Finland. It is but 21 miles from the Finnish-
*New International Yearbook, 1912, p 227. x Rayes, II, p 486.
+Finland & Russia, p 71. °Ibid. Cf speech of M. Stolypin in Duma.^>W;
I
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Norwegan frontier north of Sweden to the head of a fiord of the
Atlantic which never freezes. Railway transportation across
Finland is entirely practicable in winter and, could Russia
acquire this short right of way and develop a port on the coast
of Norway, winter traffic from Petrograd and the interior could
flow past the frozen branches of the Baltic direct to the open
sea. Imperial insistence upon uniform gauge and direct connection
between the Finnish and Russian railways may add color to this
idea, but at best it is a theoretical hypothesis which never
gained any official recognition. Finland may be needed as a
market by Russian manufacturers, but the fact that Finland's
chief exports are sold in England and Germany and that Russia
produces her own supoly of the same articles does not encourage
the development of direct exchange, while the high Russian tariff
against such articles as are manufactured in Finland in response
to Finland's free ports does not afford the basis of mutually
healthy intercourse.
Military necessity might demand that Russia should
control her border provinces in order that there might be
adequate fortification and organization for defense. In Finland
this would mean in the first instance protection against Sweden.
The project of regaining Finland long lingered in the Swedish
mind, and perhaps to-day some Swedish Finlanders would favor
reunion; but a comparison of the military resources of Sweden
and Russia would make plain at once that such an attack would
never be delivered except as a minor part of a great combination
which would largely absorb the attention of the imperial forces
in other directions. The violence with which Russif icat ion went
forward in Poland and the Baltic Provinces suggests that the
Imoerial Government felt that the frontiers must be unified as
a protection against Germany. Events have largely .justified such
an apprehension, but a German attack upon Finland (with the
possible exception of southern Viborg, which, incidentally, was
the d-'s+rict which Stolypin proposed to annex) could not be for
purposes of aggression against Russia but only for the occupation
of Finland itself* The Finns have shown themselves fceady to make
grest sacrifices in defence of their own land, but have insisted
upon the observance of the law which forbids sending their army
outside of Finland. Unquestionably the defensive value of the
*Cf A ppemdix I,
(
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Finnish troops, willingly protecting their homes from aggression,
would be greater than their share in any imperial system in which
their personal interest was lost.
The final answer to the question of Russia's justification
for the invasion of Finnish privileges, especially the legislative
freedom of the Diet, lies in an examination of the specific subjects
which the Imperial Government declared to be within the field of
general legislation and therefore taken out of the hands of the Diet
and lodged with the imperial power. Some earlier decisions go to
absurd lengths in declaring even trivial affairs to be of imperial
interest,* but the laws of 17 June, $910, set forth the chief
oronouncement uDon the subject. A study of this law will show
that some matters logically of imperial interest and others which
seem to be decidedly local in their bearing are included in the
category of general legislation. Also it will be noted that the
absolute subordination cf the local to the imperial authority is
declared and that the latter retains unlimited power to extend
the list of matters to be treated as general legislation.
Law of 17 June, 1910, (Sxtfcact).
I Laws and regulations whose operation extends to the Grand
Duchy of Finland are promulgated:
1. In the order laid down by general legislation if they
relate not only to solely internal affairs cf this country and
2. In the order laid down by special legislation if they
relate only to solely internal affairs of this country.
II Independently of the fundamental laws of the state as also
of other laws and regulations, promulgated in the general order
of legislation, whose operation extended to Finland before the
promulgation of the present law, together with statutes amending
or supplementing the same, to the number of the laws and regulations
indicated in Sec. 1 of Art. I are referred all such as define:
1. The share of Finland in State expenditure and the
institution therefor of contributions, collections and imposts.
2. Obligatory military service for the population of
Finland as also other obligations serving for military needs.
3. The rights in Finland of Russian subjects who are
not Finnish citizens.
*Finland and Russia.
1
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4. The use in Finland of the language of the State.
5. The fundamental principle of the adminiatfcation of
Finland by special institutions on a basis of special legislation.
6. The rights, obligations, and order of action in Finland
of imperial institutions and authorities.
7. The carrying out in Finland of sentences, decisions,
and rulings of courts of law and the demands of authorities of
other parts of the empire, as also of contracts and deeds
therein executed.
8. The establishment in the interests of the State of
exemptions from Finnish criminal and administrative laws.
9. The securing of the interests of the State in the
matter of drawing up the educational curriculum and inspection
of schools.
10. Bye-laws for public meetings, societies, and unions.
11. The rights and conditions of working in Finland of
firms and companies established in other parts of the Empire
and abroad.
13. Customs department and customs tariff in Finland.
14. Protection in Finland of trade and industrial marks
and patents, as also the rights of literary and artistic property.
15. The monetary system of Finland.
16. Posts, telephones, aviation and similar methods of
communication in Finland.
17. Railways and other ways of communication in Finland
in their relations to the defence of the State, as also to
communications between Finland and other parts of the Smpire
and to international communications; the railway telegraphs.
18. Navigation and pilotage and lighthouses in Finland.
19. The rights in Finland of foreigners.
III Alterations in and additions to the list of laws and
regulations contained in Article II are made in the order of
general legislation solely on the initiative of the Emperor.
IV On the points of legislation indicated in Sees. 1-19
of Art. II, the initiative belongs solely to the Emperor.
X Laws and regulations Dromulgated in the general order of
legislation (Art. I, Sec. 1) abrogate of themselves all rulings
not in accordance with them of Finnish laws and regulations
promulgated in the special order (Art. I, Sec. 2), and are
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operative notwithstanding any opposing rulings of the aforesaid
local statutes whatsoever.
XI Laws and regulations promulgated in the special order of
legislation (Art. I, Sec. 2) cannot abrogate nor amend or supplement,
nor stay, nor explain laws and regulations promulgated in the
general order (Art. I, Sec.l).
The demand for imperial control of many of these matters
seems hard to justify on grounds of imperial interest or local
expediency.
C. Did Russian Policy Effect a Legal Change in Finland's
Constitutional Status?
The western world is familiar with the phenomena
accompanying the extra-legal establishment or amendment of
constitutions. The wresting of concessions from unwilling monarchs
or privileged classes is not uncommon, and oppressive principles
have been foisted upon deluded or browbeaten peoples. The
consensus of international opinion would agree that concessions
obtained even by the method of revolution have binding legal
force if given in response to the sober and continued demand of
a large part of the people by recognized representatives of the
grantors, and that the endorsement of a proposed constitutional
s
change by a plebi.cite or by the legal representatives of a people
makes it binding upon the people as a whole. In either instance
the active observance of such constitution, either through
acknowledging obligations or demanding privileges under it,
constitutes a most positive confirmation. It has been shown that
the constitution of Finland was radically amended during this
period (1906) by the recognized legal method— the concurrent
action of the Czar-Grand Duke and the Four Estates. This action
was a tacit confirmation of the principle that in future the
fundamental laws of Finland could be amended only by the con-
current action of the Czar-Gfcand Duke and the newly constituted
unicameral Diet. The law which accomplished it contained an
express statement of the same principle.* The only ground upon
which the extra-legal changes in the Finnish constitutional
status, such as those made by the imperial law of 17 June, 1910,
Article 80, Law of 20 July, 1906.
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can claim legal force is a sustained imperial policy concurring
with general acquiescence and conformity on the part of the
Finlanders the principle of common consent.
The facts show that Russia's policy of asserting imperial
supremacy over Finnish laws was not consistently sustained but was
intermittent and spasmodic. In the last years of Alexander III
Finnish privileges were invaded, but Nicholas II abandoned this
policy and confirmed the fundamental laws at his accession. From
1899 to 1905 Russif ication proceeded vigorously, but in the latter
year the Emperor promised to abandon it and in 1906 confirmed the
reformed constitution. By 1910 the policy was again in full career.
The opposition of the Finlanders to Russif ication,
especially to the invasion of their legislative privileges, was
positive and sustained. In 1891 the protest of the Diet induced
the Czar to abandon his project for reorganizing the monetary,
customs, and transportation systems and the penal code of the
Grand-Duchy on imperial authority? The imperial manifesto of 3/15
February, 1899, asserting imperial control of Finland's legislature
and army, elicited general opposition.* Helsingfors observed a day
of mourning; and a gigantic petition of protest, bearing half a
million signatures from all parts of the Grand-Duchy, was
presented to the Czar. + The refusal of the Emperor to receive
this petition led to years of passive resistance from the Finns,
culminating on the part of the violent in the assassination of
Bobrikov in 1904, and on the part of organized labor in the third
congress of the Union of Unions, 14-15 June, 1905, and in the
gigantic strike of the October following. This strike was partly
stimulated bv the blundering local policy of Bobrikov's successor,
Prince John Obolensky. It was conducted with absolute order, but
was maintained in all the towns until the Czar's promise to
respect the constitution was received. It is said that the people
of the country districts were not in sympathy with this strike,
and it is pointed out that they openly deprecated the assassination
of the Governor-General.** The Senate did the same. The fact seems
to be that there may have been disapproval of the method but that
the nation was a unit in claiming constitutional rights.
Seignibos, p 61$. *0sten-Sacken, p 392. +DeWindt, pp 88-94.
°November according to Hayes, II, p 486. **Vladimirov.
1
- 52 -
M. Stolvpin justified the repressive policy adopted in
1908 before the Duma on the ground that revolutionary plots were
hatched with impunity under the protection of Finnish autonomy.
M. Milyukoff, Minister Secretary of State, replied with a masterly
review of facts and a strong plea for the Finnish Constitution,
but his arguments were ignored? The rapid growth of social dem-
ocracy in Finland is indicated by the wild resolution for active
resistance carried through the Diet by the Socialists at that
time. It has been shown* that the forced appropriation to connect
the Finnish with the Russian railways during the same year was
taken over the united protest of Senate, Governor-General, and
Minister Secretary of State. When summoned in extraordinary session,
14 September, 1910, to elect two members to the Imperial Council
and four to the Duma as provided in the law of 17 June, 1910, the
Diet declared that law to be void, because unconstitutionally
enacted, and refused to elect the deputies. + As has been shown,
in 191$ the sixteen judges of the 6ourt of Apoeals at Helsingfors
unanimously refused to apply the Equality Law of 1912 on the
ground that it had been enacted unconstitutionally. The ovation
accorded them by the people of the caDital on their release from
imprisonment in 1914 atteste the popular sympathy with the policy
of resistance.
During this period the Russian subordinating policy was
vacillating and ill-advised while the Finnish policy of resistance
was consistent and oositive, being voiced by the highest judicial
and legislative bodies of the Grand-Duchy, by the representative
at St. Petersburg, by the Senate, by the industrial organizations,
by the people at large, and by the lawless elements of society.
There seems no evidence for believing that the enforced changes
in Finland's constitutional status had any legal basis or binding
f orce.
4. FINLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS SINCE THE RUSSIAN
REVOLUTION 01 MARCH, 191'7.
Exactly a year has passed** since the abdication of
*Camb. Mod. Hist. X, d 377; Cf Finland & Russia for resume of this
speech by M. StolyDin. *Finland & Russia. *Ante pAX °Ante p4^-
**tfritten March 15, 1918.
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Czar Nicholas II. 'This year is in most respects the most
difficult period of Russian history to interpret. The meagreness
of reliable information and the inability to verify many apparent
fiacts, the swiftness of movement and the suddenness of change,
the confusion of coeval events and the uncertainty regarding the
future all conspire to make a thorough and scientific study of
the Deriod virtually impossible. The sober conclusions of to-day
may be absurd fancies in the light of to-morrow's developments.
However, a few facts are well known, and a careful analysis of
these will furnish some basis for a /judgment of the legal relations
of Finland and revolutionary Russia.
The overthrow of monarchy in Russia came suddenly and
almost without warning in the early days of March, 1917. It came
as the climax of weeks of suf f ering. and food shortage in the
capital district due to the incompetence and manipulation of
officials and speculators. The spirit of revolt probably would
not have crystallized into revolution, despite the popular anger
at official venality and treason, but for the demand of Rodzianko,
president of the Duma, that the Czar take immediate action to
relieve distress and reestablish popular confidence in the govern-
ment, followed by the refusal of the Duma to dissolve when the
Cabinet ordered its dissolution in the name of the Czar. The troops
in Petrograd promptly went over to the revolutionists, placed
themselves at the service of the Duma, and helped to hunt down
all supporters of the government. All governmental functions were
taken over by the Duma, and a provisional government was formed
of the ablest and most trusted members. The Czar was at the front
during these events. Hastening to the capital to quell the revolt,
he was stopped at Pskoff. Here on March 15, 1917, he abdicated the
throne in favor d>f his brother Michael. Shortly afterward this last
of the Romanoffs likewise surrendered all claim to royal power on
demand of the revolutionaries.
The chief difficulty of the revolutionists resulted from
the widely differing theories of how the government should be
organized. The more judicious, led by Milyukoff, proposed a limited
monarchy under a constitution to be drafted by a constituent
assembly to be elected as soon as possible bp universal suffrage.
The radicals demanded the immediate establishment of a republic,
(
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and added various demands for farreaching agrarian and social reforms.
For a time the factions were harmonized through the efforts of
Kerensky, who en/joyed the confidence of all parties and combined
the enthusiasm of the socialist with the judicious caution of the
conservative. A compromise cabinet was formed, containing several
Socialist ministers, and the Duma adjourned. The radical Council
of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates remained in session, and soon
began invading the .iurisdiction of the government by issuing
Drociamations to the army and announcing reforms upon their own
authority. A new cabinet crisis arose, and Kerensky was made premier.
For a short time he succeeded in maintaining some semblance of order,
but his difficulties were increased by revolt in the army, and la^e
in 1917 the government was seized by the branch of the revolutionists
most radical in their demands the Maximalists or Bolsheyiki. Their
le&ders have announced an ambitious program of internal reform and
have attemoted to negotiate an immediate peace with the Central
Powers. The terror of the continued German invasion, added to the
confusion and disunion in various parts of the empire, makes it
difficult to estimate the actual effectiveness of the Bolsheviki
government.
In the early days of the Russian revolution the Finnish
Diet formally declared the independence of the Grand-Duchy. The
provisional government refused to recognize Finnish (likewise
Ukranian) independence, insisting that the constitutional status
of parts of the empire should wait for settlement until the close
of the war, although it had already proclaimed the principle of
self-determination of national groups. While Minister of Justice,
Kerensky made a hasty trip to Helsingfors and addressed the Diet
in the interests of imperial unity. It is of interest to note
that there was a Minister for Finnish Affairs in the first
revolutionary cabinet, but in the coalition cabinet of a few
weeks later there is no mention of that portfolio.* Both the
orovisional government of the Duma and the Bolsheviki announced
the principle of self-determination, but neither carried this
I profession into action with full consistency, for each has
resisted by force the demand of the Ukraine for independence,
and in a lesser degree has opposed the free choice of the Finns.
*Marcosson, Cf pp 97 and 147.
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In January, 1918, M. Trotsky on behalf of the Bolsheviki government
recognized the right of the Finnish people to determine their
constitutional status without hindrance and pledged the speedy
withdraaal of Bolsheviki troops. The as yet imperfectly confirmed
dispatchesof March, 1918, stating that the Finnish people through
their Diet are asking that a German prince become their king, tend
to confirm the report that the complete right of self-determination
ha3 been fully acknowledged by the de facto government in Petrograd.*
An analysis of these facts leads to the conclusion that
constitutionally and legally Finland is independent. The Russian
revolution overthrew the only imperial authority which either the
Finnish constitution oJT the Finlanders had ever recognized, and
established in its olace a temporary authority resting upon
legislative power and pledged to give way to a constitutional
government at the earliest moment when it could be established
by a constituent assembly to be elected by universal suffrage.
Finland already had such a government in operation and a represent-
ative assembly so constituted, sustained by a much longer experience
in constitutional government and bv more fully developed institutions
than Russia enjoyed. Finnish independence was declared by the
representative Diet, the only part of the legal agency for amending
the constitution which still existed. The success of the Finnish
government in suppressing, the lawlessness of the Red Guard and in
restoring order, sustained by the confidence of the great mass of
the Finnish people, coupled with the democratic philosophy of
self-determination of the Russian revolutionaries and later de
facto government, serves doubly to confirm the independent status
which the Diet has proclaimed. The only legal bases on which
Finnish independence can be lost are the restoration of the
Romanoffs or the free choice of the people.
*Based upon newspaper reports, January-March, 1918.
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IV. FINLAND'S FUTURE
No person will be hardy enough to predict in detail the
future of any of the small nations involved in the European confusion.
A few facts are reasonably patent. Finland will not become a great
agricultural or manufacturing nation. Her industries will be limited
by forces of necessity to the preparation and export of forest and
dairv products and to minor enterprises* Her democratic and
progressive spirit is so founded in a broad cultivation of the
popular mind that it will live and be a force. Ker geographical
situation is such that her national development will be organic
and internal, regardless of the presence or absence of political
ties with any nation.
The alternatives of political status are:
Independence— The same international rank as
that of Sweden. or Denmark;
Federation— Co-ordinate rank in a group of associated
nat ions;
Autonomy— Local freedom under the general confcfcol
of a superior state;
Subjugation— Involuntary submission to an external
authority.
The first is the situation which the Finnish government
has claimed for the Grand-Duchy since the overthrow of the Czars.
This claim has been so far made good that Finland is held to be
de facto independent.
The second is little other than an hypothesis. A federation
of nations might be evolved from the Russian anarchy. Finland would
find a more congenial place in a Scandinavian federation if such
a project should be seriously proposed. However, such an arrangement
could have little advantage save for mutual defence; and that purpose,
if it continues a necessarv consideration of the small state, aan
be more readily served by vital alliances.
*Gf APPendix I, FSf ff:
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The third alternative detained interest so lonG as
Russia possessed a unitary Government . Present conditions make
Finnish autonomy under Russia appear an absurdity, as Finland
possesses to-day an experience in representative Government and
an organized system far in advance of those of republican Russia.
The only argument for such a status would be the need of pro-
tection of the small nation by the superior state— a protection
that Russia does not appear likely soon to be able to Give.
The involuntary subjugation of the Finlanders by a
reorganized Russia or by Germany would be antagonistic to the
consciousness and idealism of the people; it would be contrary to
the principle of self-determination in national units declared
by the western powers to be essential henceforth in world politics
it would be artificial, and so doomed to ultimate overthrow.
I
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V. SHALL FINLAND BE INDEPENDENT?
Tie are now facs to fac3 with the osntral and final
question. Viewed in the light of right, justice, and expediency,
wholly apart from Questions of vested interest or artificial
claims, shall Finland be independent? A few words will summarize
the evidence.
We have seen that Finnish nationality in General
conforms to racial lines and is largely a product of the forces
of permanent geographic isolation. It is enshrined in the
literature of the growingly dominant language and to a large
extent in the educational and religious ambitions of the people.
It has been vitalized by progressive ideals and institutions and
brought to active expression by the aggressive policy of Russia.
We have also seen that Finland possessed a liberal constitution
under Sweden and retained it under Russia; that the imperial
encraachments UDon guaranteed rights were earnestly opposed and
the constitution jealously guarded; that the overthrow of the
recognized imperial authority led the Finns to formal declaration
and the establishment of de facto independence; that future
Drobabil it ies hold small reason for other arrangement and that
the alternatives are undesirable.
From a consideration of these facts but one conclusion
seems hill possible; namely
—
THAT FINLAND'S CLAD/. TO INDEPENDENCE IS THE LOGICAL
CLIMAX OF HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS; THAT IT IS JUST-
IFIED BY PRESENT CONDITIONS AND FUTURE PROBABILITIES;
AND THAT IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED AND RESPECTED IN
INTERNATIONAL DEALINGS.
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APPENDIX I
Finland's loo no mi o Self-Sufficiency.
Readers of the foregoing point out that the degree to
which Finland may be said to be self-sufficing in economic
matters might well have been discussed in relation to the
question of the expediency of independence. A few words added
in this place may be of some value.
In the early times Finland was pefcforce self-sufficing,
as were all primitive peoples in the days when transportation
was difficult and frequently interrupted. Climatic conditions
made this a more serious matter for Finland than for some more
southerly lands. Agriculture is a decidedly precarious venture
north of the Baltic because the early frosts frequently damage
or destroy the crops. In early times famines due to crop failure
resulted in mush suffering and frequently in much loss of life,
till the development of transportation and tfcade made it possible
to relieve local necessity from the greater abundance of more
fortunate districts. Of the necessities, Finland's dairy products
seem to be the most reliable and abundant in supply, with fish
and agricultural products taking subordinate places. Forest
products will be abundant for many years to come, but mineral
resources are decidedly limited. It would appear that Finland
as a whole could not long supply the economic needs of any but
a positively primitive people. Probably the most serious lack
is that of iron for the manufacture of machinery a prime
necessity in national development or in defence.
The fact that Finland is dependent upon other nations
for some vital economic necessities is not so significant an
objection to Finnish independence as it might have been in more
primitive times. Economic dependence and self-sufficiency are
purely relative terms. Some nations are more immediately and
vitally dependent than others, but none are absolutely self-
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sufficing. This has been forcefully demonstrated during the
European war. France has suffered for need of coal and sugar.
England has faced a constant food problem. Germany's need of
cotton, rubber, and copper has become acute. Scarcely one of
the European nations is really self-sufficing in regard to the
necessities of life and industry, not to mention the common
conveniences which are not strictly necessary.
Finland has depended upon England for a market for her
dairy products and has sold fish in Germany. Eoth have been good
customers for Finnish lumber. On the other hand some food stuffs
have been imported from Russia and agricultural and mill
machinery from America. It is difficult to state what outside
nation is most essential to Finland's economic progress or
which could singly best supply her necessities, but probably
if geographic situation be considered Germany could advance
the strongest claim.
The future of the small nation in Europe truly is
problematic, but the relatively free interchange of goods must
surely soon be reestablished and will be maintained as the
normal intercourse of nations. Absolute dependence upon outside
sources for some articles may be no more vital than relative
dependence for others, but neither need have a large significance
in times of peace. Studied in the light of possible international
associations, the question of Finland's economic self-sufficiency
in relation to her claim to independence is a subordinate
consideration.
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APPENDIX II
GERMANY AND FINLAND, MARCH- APRIL, 1918.
During the six weeks which have elapsed since the
writing of the foregoing attempt at an interpretation of
current events in Russia and Finland,* interesting developments
have taken place. The most patent fact is the uncertaintv,
confusion, and frequent contradiction of the news dispatches.
The events of this period further demonstrate the futility of
attempting to infer the future in any detail from the facts of
the present.
The facts seem to be that Germany has gained control
of southern Finland, first by seizing the Aland Isles, then the
southern ports and the capital, then the transportation lines
of chief consequense. Apparently the Finnish White Guard,
fighting for the Diet and the established order as claimants
to independence, have effectively suppressed the Rsd Guard,
who posed as the champions of Finland's affiliation with the
Bolsheviki and her continued dependence upon Russia.
The Germans appear to have taken complete control
of the White Guard (and presumably of the Helsingfors government)
and are using it in an attack upon the line of communication
acfcoss northern Finland or Lapland which the western powers have
been keeping open with Petrograd.* This attack of the troops of
the de facto government under German tutelage upon the allies
who are guarding the last road from Russia to the west places
Finland in effect among the allies of the Central powers. It is
said that numbers of Finns have been serving in the German
armies, and have carried on a systematic program of pro-German
propaganda upon their return home. However this may be, it does
not seem probable that there is any broad or deep sympathy with
*Cf Ante, p 52 ff. xCf Ante, pp 46-47
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the German cause as such among the mass of the Finnish people,
especially among those of Finnish speech. The explanation of
Finland's reported relations with Germany which seems most
likely in the light of general facts is that the government
was compelled to choose between submission to the German
overlordship or an attach while still in the threes of civil
war from the power which absolutely controled the Baltic and
was overrunning the Baltic provinces of Russia. The fear of
coercion from the Bolsheviki or from another government which
might supplant them may have further stimulated the Finlanders
to submit to German control. The situation seems to be another
instance of the familiar case of the small nation in north-
western Europe which must endure insult and injury without
resistance and without protest because of the helplessness of its
position should it incur the hostility of Germany. Finland is
much further removed from possible assistance from the west than
the Netherlands, Denmark, or Norway.
The justice of German control of Finland need not be
considered nor the methods by which it might gain legal
sanction. Subjugation to autocratic imperial Germany is repugnant
to the democracy of Finnish idealism and of the recognized
constitution. Subjugation to a reconstituted democratic Germany
could come only through the free choice of the people expressed
through a plebiscite or through a diet elected definitely upon
this issue. Such a reconstit ution of Germany would bring with
it such a guaranteed freedom for the small nation that the right
of self-determination could be exercised in safety. The western
powers are absolutely committed to this principle. There is
every reason to believe that, free from the menace of Russian ebb
coercion or a German blocade, the freely expressed will of the
Finnish people would be almost solidly for national independence.
Hudson, New Hampshire.
April 29, 1918.
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